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INTRODUCTION
-Definitive A.pecta"
The "Polish Oorridor" was a derisive
designation given by the Germana, to • certain
portion or .ector of land. bordering on the
Baltio Se. in Northern Europe.

While

80me

of

the Oorridor lay on the east of the Viatula River,
most of it was to the west of that main polish
artery.

It was ai tuated between pomerania on the
weat, and Danzig and Eaat Pruaaia on the east. l
!he Corridor waa wedge shaped, of varying Widths,
but widest at its southernmost boundary.

2

It was usual17 assumed that the Corridor
compriaes approximately those parts of the former
German provincea of Weat Prussia and posen
extending from Bomberg (Bydgoszos) to the Baltic.

3

This region was a part of the German Empire up
until the close of the World War.

It embodied the

efforts of the Peaoe Conference at Versailles to give
to the Poles a free and secure accesa to the Bea.'

t. Diison, WIllIam Sarbutt, Germanz under the Treatz.
2.
3.

p. 102
Ibid., p. 102
atone, Shepard, "German polish Disputes," Foreist .
policy Reporta, Vol. IX. No.9, p. 102, JUly S, 933
Se,mour, Charles, The Intimate papers ~ Colonel
Rouee, Vol. IV, p.-mrO

r
2.

It is the purpose of this study to inquire
into the history, the .otive for, the Justice and
the expedienoy of this creation or allocation by
the Peace Conference.
!he reappearance of poland at the pariS Peace
Conference in 1919 wss one of the most signifioant
and unique events in our age.

• nation whioh hal

had a great and memorable past and whioh had under-

gone diasection in peace time at the hands of its
greedy neighbors, came to life again, and was seeki.,
once more a looal habitation and a name.

!hi. signi-

fied something more than the mere revival of a
vaniahed state:

It stood for the triumphant righting

of one of the greatest politioal wrongs that Europe
had ever witneBsed, the vindioation of the prinoiple.
of Justice, right. and fair dealtng in international
relations. l
The Treaty of Versaille8 has been termed by
some as C~aginian peace. 2

!he epithet, which implies

injustice. or treachery. is misleadins.

!he politioal

map of Europe, as it has been drawn in the peace
treaties, no doubt, compares favorably with the map

1. Haekins, Charles Homer and Lord. Robert Howard,
80me Problems of the Peace Conference, p. 163

8.

~sil,

Roman:-pO!ind, p. 9

r

I.

which it replaoed and was more closely in aooord
with the wishes of the populations conoerned than
any previous arrangements of land areas in European
history_
!he real objeotion to the !r8aties w,s not that
they were

un~ust.

and idealistio o

but that they were too impractioal
the Western Slav, the universal

bondsman of the early Middle Ages, is delivered fro.
the !euton, the MUsoovite and the ~gyar.l Will the.e
Slav states whioh have been oreated by the !reaties.
establish themselves in the esteem and oonfidenoe of
Burope, will they be eoonomioally sound uaits, and
can they suooe.sfully resist the dangers which may
prooeed from the valiant unreconoi1ed aristooraoies
of prussia, Russia, and Austria?

these questions. the

futUre alone oan answer.
Of 811 the new oreations by the peace treaties,
poland was the most important, the most interesting, an'
the most oontroversial.

All through history the poles.

like the Irish. haye been in the oenter of the strife:
oombative. adventurous. temperamental, irrepressible.
!heir annals have been marked by extreme vioissitudes

of fortune; at one time they have been masters of a

1.

Dyb0 slti,

Roman, QE.:. cit., p.

9

r

,.
wide Empire stretohing from the Baltio to the Blaok
8ea, at

~other

time, partitioned and obliterated.

1

If one of the requisites of a sOTereign state
i8 a body of people oooupying a partioular territory
and politioally organised under one government. poland
was not a sovereign state When it appeared at Versaillea,
for it was not organized potentially or aotualll under
one gOTernment, nOr did it oocupy a definite territory.
It was merely a phantom roaming around in the norther.
plain8 someWhere between Germany and Russia; and what
this disembodied spirit would look like if olothed
agaia in flesh and blood, no one aotually knew.

2

It was, then, to be a part of the work of the
Peaoe Conference to mark out and to determine ita
boundariea.
It may be illuminating at thi8 point to inquire
into the manner of poland's extinotion as a nation in
the eighteenth oentury, and to rehearse the .Tents
and aotions that brought about its partition••
Attention might be fo.uaed on the fact that at
the time of poland's exit from the family of nationa,
the so oalled, "polish Corridor," was an undisputed
part of polish territory.

1. Dyboail, Roman,
2.

HaskiDs,

~

£!l:..

~ cIt., pp. 9-10
Charlea~mer-and Lord, Robert

Howard,

pp.156-57

~-------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAPTER I
THE

PARTITIONS
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CHAPTER I
THE PARTITIOIS
The partitions of poland b;y its three close
neighbors: Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772,
1793, and 1796 have long been considered the 01a8si.
example of

inter~ational

eighteenth .entur;y.

wrong and· crime in the

IO less a person than Thomas

Jefferson, third President of the unite4 States,
has denounoed the partitions of poland
preoedent,"

.s •

a "crime," and an "atrooit;y.-

wbaneful

1

George Olemenoeau said that the partition of
poland was the greatest orime in histor;y. also that
it left an everlasting stigma on the names of
Oatherine, )faria Theres., and 'rederiok II.
wlo outrage had ever le8s exouse, no violence
perpetrated against humanit;y ever oried loUder for

a redress that had been indefinitel;y postpone4.

The

wrong was so great that no time in the life of Europe,
among

80

man;y other acts of violenoe for whioh there

was no expiation. could it appear les8 heinous.
,has beoome a byword in histor;y

88

It

one of the worst

felonies that can be laid to the charge of our
oivilization."2

I.
2.

Basiiia, Charles Homer and Lord, RObert Howarl,
~

Cit., p. 1M

~mi:Diiau,

p. 193

George, Grandeur

~

M1serl

~

Victor"

6.

80me writers profeas to trace the idea of
the p,rtition of poland back for more than a oenturr
before it was an aooomplished faot. l Certainlr the
idea waa not new.

It had been discussed as earlr

8S

1656 by Charles X of SWeden and the Great Eleotor,

Frederick William; and for a oentury the idea hauntet
the statesmen of many European oountries, emargins
in the sinister half shadows of memoranda and projeot.,
oaly to be buried to a troubled rest.

Whether

'rederiok the Great was the first author of a definite
soheme is disputable ant irrelevant and inoonsequential
to the main development.
!he seoond or third largest state in Europe with
an area of 282,000 square miles. standing fourth in

population with over 11,000,000 people, hat be..
destroyed. 2

Its frontier had extended from the Balti.

Sea and the Carpathian Mountains to the Dneiper and
the Dvina Bivera.

It inoluded nearly the whole of that

broad isthans between the Baltio S8a and the Blaok Sea
whioh leads from Eastern Continental Europe to the
peninsular Europe of the west.

3

Nevertheless, it had

been oompletely and totally obliterated from the map of

c. G•• !he
Evolution of Prussia, pp. 151-52
--!emperiey.-a. I. V•• History of the Peace Conferenoe
of paris. Vol. VI. p. 223
-- --Ibid., p. 223

1. lirrlott, 3. H. R. and RObertson,
2.

3.

7.

Europe by its great land grabbing and land hungry
neighbora.

1

Certain observations of poland's historioal
oatastrophe, namely the three partitions, easi17
suggest themselvee to the outside observer indifferently
convereant with general European histor7. 2 Thus, BO"
bearings of Poland's geographical positio. on her fate
are obvious enough.

fhat position waa a "key" position

at the crosBing of old established and important trade
routee between the northern and southern seae, ant
the western and eaetern lands of Europe. 3 1s suoh, it
waa bound to make Poland a flourishing power in international trade in the Middle Ages; but it inevitably
lost its advantages with the olosing up of Europea.
south-east by the TUrkish conquest, and then the opening
up of a neW world acroea the western seas for European
trade; oommeroial wealth, and with it politioal power
were fated to ebb away from Poland in the modern era
qUite as easy as it was fated to ebb away from the
Venetian and other Italian Republioa.'
Viewed from yet another angle, poland's fate seema

1. Buell, Raymond LeSlie, lurope, p. 19'
2.

3.

4.

Dlboski, Roman, ~ Cit., p. 16
Bowman, Isaiah, "!lii Bew World, p. 2'11
femperley, H••• -;;,-0;. Cit., Vol. VI, p. 219

r
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to fall into line with certain wider developments
in the Buropean world. Those who hold it a8 an
established truth that since the Reformation Protestant
powers in Europe generally advanced in strength an4
importance, while Catholic nations deoaye4, may thiDk
of the 014 poland as doomed together with Bpain, an4
only affecte4 more tragioally than Spain itself,
because much less favorably situate4 on the map.

But

even those who do not believe in Protestantism aa an
elixir vital for nations, will be inolined to think
that poland perished, among other reasons because ahe
4i4 not make the best either of Protestantiaa or
Catholicism. l
poland stood aside in the great religious wars
of the seventeenth century, then lapsed into a
passivity Which made her a prey for foreign nationa.
aer inactivity in the great wars of the eighteenth
eentury and her consequent sufferings, were from that
point of view but symptoms of vanishing prestige:
irreaolute religious toleranoe was followed by the
pacifism of paralyais.
But surely Poland's attitude--whatever it waa-OB

the great religious issue of early modern timea

was not in itself a suffioient cause for the overthrow

1. Dyboail, Roman, Ope Cit., pp. 16-17

9.

of what was then a vast monarchy of great international power, rich resouroes, and a high degree
of Gulture.
Should we then, fin4 the aeed of poland's
dissolution in the very process of her territorial
growth?

That growth indeed, has certain peculiarities

which have an evident bearing on poland's extraordinary
fate.

An examination of the territorial growth of
Poland and its later deoay, ahows that the impedimenta
surrounding the oonstruction of the Polish-Lithuanian
monarch7 on all side. were indeed too great to allow
ita complete realization and continued aafe eXistenee.
The rival power of the Hapsburg dynasty and SWeden,
the unending preoccupation with the Diet, the extraordinary growth of RuSSia, and finally, the German
barrier on the Baltio, fixed sinoe the early Middle
Ages, all these oombining, would have taxed the
strength of a state much larger, rioher, and more
firmly aettled in its internal conditions than the
Poliah-Lithuanian empire ever became through the fQur
centuries of its united eXistence. l
We pass to a more intensive review of Polish
history during the period of the partition••

1. D7boski, Boman,

~

cIt.,

p.

17

r
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Prederick II was not on friendly terms with
most of his neighbors.

But he determined to oultivate

the friendship of Catherine II of RUssia and he a180
aided her in bringing to the vacant Polish throne her
former lover. Stanislaus poniatowski.
At Catherine's request, 'rederiok sent prussian
troops into poland and shortly before the election of
the Polish king. signed a treaty with catherine in
whioh she secured all the advantages of the treaty
for herself, 'rederiok promising to interfere i_
poland for the sake of purely RUssian interests.

It

was hinted however, that in oase of war he might hope
for compensation.
By a neW treaty with Russia, 1767. 'rederiok

agreed that under certain oircumstanoes, he would throw
an

a~

into Austrian territory; but, in suoh a case,

he fully 1ntended to compensate himself at the oost of
poland. 1
Irederiok reoogn1zed the danger of an Austro-Russian
war in whioh Prus8ia must fight for RuSSia With doubtful
prospects of compensation, the oertainty that cather1ne
meant to abSOrb
of Austria

and

~urkish

territory. and that Joseph II

Xaunits, hi. min1ster, were determined to

1. Henderson, Irne.t I.,
pp. 206-20'

!

shOrt HIstory of Germanz,

11.

haTe compensation, to break up the Busso-prussian
Alliance if possible, and 8ubstitute a BussO-.lustriUl
undertSking in its place.
faculty of

~rederick's

Intrigue sharpened eTer7

mind and in this great game of

strategy and chicanery he had the more leTel head, the
more experienced hand, and a definite and limited
object - the acquisition of West prussia.
He held right to his allianoe with Catherine and
when Joseph of Austria in 1770 sei.ed the Polish
district of Zips to satisfy an old claia, he flung
his troops into Elbing.

On January 28, 1772, the

aecret treaty with Buasia riTeted catherine and Frederiek
in an agreement to partition poland, and there waa
nothing for Joseph to do but to fight Prussia and
Bussia, Or join the agreement on the best terms he
could malte.

War, as Frederick

h~d

foraeen, waa

uaneaeBeary if the three despots of eastern Europe
would aggrandize themselTes at the expense of a defenseless neighbor.

By the treaty of February 19, 1772, Austria joined
in, and after fiTe months spent in aettling details the
Partition was an accomplished fact. 1 A previous
ag~eement

between Prussia and Bussia had been made in

1. Lewinski-Corwin, Edgar H.,

!! -.P....,ol__8n
__
d, p.

311
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St. Petersburg on

~ebruary

6, 1778.

Joseph aoquired

Galicia and Lodomeri&, Catherine a large strip of
Lithuania, and

~rederick,

west Prussia, with pomerellen

and Ermelaad, but without nansig or !hora.

On

September 13, the proclamation of annexation waa
made • 1
• rederick II had been the chief instigator of
the first partition.

By this partition poland lost

one-third of her territory. but the great fortresses
of Danzig and Thorn, very much coveted by
remained in the possession of poland.

~ederick.

!hree years

later (1775) the poles accepted a revised constitution
Which, though m&king for more orderly and more economical
administration. left poland entirely dependent upon
Russia.

But when in 1788 Russia became involvet in

war both with

~urkey

and SWeden, the anti-Russian party

among the Poles led by _dam Cosimer csartoruski an4
Ignatius potocki, seised the opportunity of electinc
a Diet pledged to secure a liberal and independent
con8titution for their unhappy country.

!he Diet,

which met at WarBaw in October, 1788, lasted four yeara.
secured the withdrawal of Russian troops and entered
into cordial relations with 'rederick William II of
Prussia.

1.

The latter readily oonoluded an offenaive

jarrIott,
Evolution

J. I. k. and Robertson,
!! Prussia, p. 162

C. Grant.

!!!

13.

and defensive alliance with the Poles, and offered to
recover for them Austrian Galicia, provided the7
were willing to hand over Dansig and Thorn to him.
But while they procrastinated, Prussia and Austria
oame to terms at Reichenbach and Poland had lost its
chanoe.

Nevertheless, the Polish patriots made a

desperate effort to put what remained of their house
in order.
In 1791 a new constitution inspired by British
practioe and the French Revolution was adopted that
gave prospects of making the country strong and
~ite4.

It represented a sinoere effort to convert

the oountr,r into a oonstitutional monarch1.

The

electlve monarchy, the liberum veto, and the right of
confederation were swept 8W87; the exeoutive was vested
in a hereditary king, assisted by a responsible ministr7;
there was to be a bi-camersl legislature, inoluding
representatives of the cities; the osste system was
abolished and a large installment of sooial reform was
effected. l
The adoption of this model oonstitution oame
surprise to Europe.

8S

a

The neW constitution was an aot

of defianoe to catherine, who was pledged to maintain

1. Bue!i, Raymond Lesile, poland, p. 47

----------------------------------~

.-....

-----~-

14.

the anarchy enshrined in the Constitution ot 1775.
fhe other partitioners t however, looked more kindly
upon it.

To Austria, a poland strengthened an4

renovated would have been an undoubted advantage.
'rederick William ot Prussia cordially congratulate'
the Poles on the Constitution ot 1791.
In 1792 the situation was again in several way_
more tavorable to RuSSia, not least by reason of
the tact that the Austrians were involved in war
with France.

With Austria out of the tield, Russia

no longer feared Prussia, cODSequently a small group
of prO-Russian poles formed the Confederation of
Targowica, denounced the new constitution
and demanded their ancient libertiea.

8S

despotic,

When they

appealed to catherine tor help, only too willingly
Catherine complied.

A Russian torce was sent into

poland and before the end of June poland was once
more in the grip ot Bussia.

1

The notable reforms devised in 1'91 were swept
away. the old archaic oonstitution was restered, ..,
Catherine, despite a strong protest from Austria, took
toll fro. her Polish triends in the shape otsome
98,000 square milea of territory and three million
i.

luell, laymond Lesile, Ope

~,

p. IS-49

15.

people.

Prussia, admitted to a share of the spoil,

got Dansig and !horn with the provinces of Great
poland, Gnesen, Kalisch, and Posen, including in all
about a million and a half of people and 22,000 square miles
of territory.l

!he partitioners promised to use their

good offioes to seoure the Bavarian exohange for
Austria, a concession which did little to plesse the
emperor.

Austria, however, was deeply engaged in the

west, and her protests against the second partition
could therefore be safely disregarded.
The Polish patriots did everything in their
power to avert the loas of another part of their country,
but they struggled in vain, and on September 23, 1793,
the Diet at Grodno gave silent assent to the cession of
Posen, DanZig, and Thorn to PrUSSia, and at the same
time revoked all the proceedings of 1791 and entered
into a formal alliance with Russia.
As a crime against the prinoiples of nationality
and independence the partition of 1793 was even worse
than that of 1772.

!he two really responsible

partitioners, 'rederick of Prussia and Catherine of
Russia, might in 1772 have sensibly pleaded that poland
had shown herself inoapable of reform; that, as she
1.

Marriott, J. I. R.
Cit., p. 187

~

t

and Robertson, C. Grant,

r
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then stood, she was a perpetual menace to the aeeurit7
of her neighbors and to the peace of Europe, and that
Prussia and Russia were merely reoovering lands whioh
in the past Poland had taken from them.
But no similar plea oould avail to exouse the
partition of 1793.

The poles had manifested not mere17

the desire but the ability to set their house in order.
In the eyes of the partitioners the orime of the
reformers of 1791 was that they did their work too
well; that they might have given a new and vigorou.
life to Poland and thus have interposed a fatal ani
final barrier to the aggre8Bions of her powerful neighbor •• l
The Polish patriots did not aoquiesoe tamely i.
the seoond dismemberment.

After it had bee. oonsummated

in 1793, the Russians were Virtually in militar7
oooupation of what still remained of independent
Polan4.
In Maroh, 179., however, the Polish arm, rose under
their former leader !adenas Kosoiusko.

This valiant

hero after the partition of 1793 had undertaken & ·mission
to paris.

He returned to poland, oalled upon hi.

oountrymen to throw off the yoke of Russia and prussia,

r.

Karriott,
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and expelled the Russian garrison from Cracow, warsaw,
and Vilna.

'or some months Kosciusko was practically

master of poland; but his triumph was short lived.
In M*y, 1'94. lrederick William placed himself at the
head of a prussian

ar~

and marched into poland.

In

JUne the prussians won a decisive victory at Rawka.
!he Russians then inflicted a crushing defeat upon
K08Ciusko.

Kosciusko's defeat was soon fcllowed by

the extinction of his countr,y.
In January. 1'96, Catherine II came to a secret
arrangement With the Emperor, to which Prussia was
to be subsequently invited to adhere.

!he Russian

frontier was advanced up to the river Bug, and an
addition of territory Which brought with it about
1,200,000 inhabitants was made.

Austria obtained

Cracow With the palatinates of sandomir and Lubelsk,with about 1,000,000 people.

Prussia was to haTe warsaw

with the district between the Oder. the Bug, and the
Iiemen, but only on condition that she acquiesced in
further accession of territory both to Russia and
Austria at the expense of

~key.

'rederick William was highly indignant, a8 well
he might be at the treatment accorded to him by Ruesia. l
i.

Bueii, Raymond Lesile, Ope Cit., p. 51
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Aa things were he had no option but to aoquiesoe
in the terms offered to hia, and so in 1795, Bew East
Prussia was added to his dominions with another million
of Polea,

The partitioners thus destroyed the poliah

State; they did not and could not, however, destroy
or exterminate the Polish natio••
The partitioners' actions and espeoially
'rederick's actions in the first partition have been
defended; first, because poland was a d7ing kingdoa
whioh the surgery of partition restored to a new life
in the march of prussian civilization and progress;
seoond, beoause the partitioners had taken baok
territory whioh had onoe been their own and again,
beoause the prussian aoquisitions were reolaimed
with marvellous labor, and had conferred on it the
blessings of an enlightened autooracy and an effioient
administration; fourth, beoause if Yrederiok had not .
interfered, Catherine and Joseph would have mad. *h.
partitions, and Frederick would have obtained nothing;
fifth, because the geographical, political, and
military needs of prussia required that the gap between
East Prussia and Prussian Pomerania should be filled 1n;
and lastly, beoause without the annexation, prussia
oould never have played the part in German and Europe..

----------~---~~~-~~-~-
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history that she has subsequently played to the
indisputable benefits of Germany, Europe, and
heraelf.

1

These arguments are simply illuminated angles
and varianta of the oentral dootrine that ends justifJ
means and that reason of state and law of dynastio
needs baoked by bayoneta are superior to all other
oonsiderationa.

They would apply to and justify any

and every aggressive oonquest.
and remain a orime.

The partitions were

B

This brings us to the oonaideration of the
question of how far Poland's internal oonditions
oontributed to the deoay of her politioal power and
to her final undoing.

It is on this great problem that

the opinions of historians and scholars are most
sharply divided, and stand out most glaringly against
eaoh other.
Foland had a fully developed parliamentary systea,
while the monarohies which dismembered her were· more or
le8s absolute.

Hence the verdiot of some modernists

that Poland's parliamentary institutions were too far
advanoed for the age, and Foland perished as a martyr

1. lirrlott, J. I. R. and RObertson, C. Grant,
pp. 152-53
Il)ld.. p. 153

~~,
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tor progressive ideas to be realized generally only
in a somewhat later period.
~his

interpretation iB opposed to the older

dootrine of the so-called "Craoow school" ot
hiBtorians, a doctrine dominant in Polish scholarship

.

for a long time, and largely consonant with the views
of foreign -- especially German -- students of Polisk
hiBtory.
According to thiB doctrine -- which had its
origin in the depressed mood of the nation atter the
tailure of the inaurreotion of 1863. poland teli from internal weakness and not from outside interference; had
she deserved to live Burope would have prevented the
partitions by some ooncerted effort; her past was only
a sham greatness oovered with a tinsel ot glory that
oo•• ealed the rotten core; there was no possible future
tor such a nation. l
~he old poland brought her
catastrophe upon herself through ill use made ot
parliamentary liberties: freedom degenerating into
lioense, the rights of the individual being unduly
extolled and his duty to the state neglected, all
attempts at administrative or social reform baffled
by this arohaio individualism and by the clasa egoism
of the nobility and gentry_

1. Humphrey, Grace, Poland the Unexplorel, pp. 320-21
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poland perished throagh lack of a strong central
government authority. and ensuing lack of enforcement
in all matters vital to the life of the state -Justioe, finanoe, military organization, and
sistenoy in foreign policy.

OOB-

1

This fatalistic vie. which oertainly had a large
body of facta in Polish history to support it. suffered
from limitations proper to all suoh general theories;
it often overlooked positive aOhievements, or minimized their relative importanoe, whioh in some case.
only beoame apparent in our own da78.
!o combine a great measure of popular liberty
with the necessary strength of central state authority
seems tOday next to impos8ible.

Yet this was the

task which Poland faced at the time when her territorial growth and international prestige were at their
height, and her political and moral responsibilities
accordingly the gravest and the greatest.
'Ie have examined now in a brief survey, the
possible causeS of old Poland's decay and fall and
aOml

explanations of her

~sterious

survival after

political death, and we arrive at the deep truth. that
the foroea of the spirit are the true sources of life.

1. DYboail, lOmBa,

~

CIt.,

pp. 24-25
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NeYer extinguished in the 80cial organism of poland,
and more active than ever in the last stage. of her
material decay, they were to tide that nation acrosa
the dark abyss of captivity and subjection into a
renewed fullness of existenoe in a later period.

CHAPfER II
~ROM

THE PARTITIONS TO THE PEACE CONlERElCB

r
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CHiP!ER II

FROM THE PARTITIONS TO THE PEACE COIFERENCE
fhe century and more ot poland's division between
her three neighboring empires and of the government of
the nation by foreign rulers might at present, with
poland reunited and tree, appear to be but a dark
interTSl which it would be best to pass unnoticed in
surveying the history of Poland with regard to it.
bearings on the present.
yet the century during which modern poland wa.
deprived of unity and freedom, was no other than the
great nineteenth century, the era of the growth of
democracy, of gigantic achievements in science and
technology. of the awakening of nations long submerged
in darkness and tyranny. and of the development. in
Empire-building, and in international trade which
led up to the greatest convulSion and revolution in
recorded history.
The record of the nineteenth century poland was
one of oeaseles8, untiring, and active resistance to
foreign domination by every possible means and on
every ocoasion which the course of international affaire
aeemed to offer.

Hence the reputation which the Pole.

in the nineteenth century acquired allover Europe of

•

r

being the most persistent and the most romantio
military adventurers in the world.

1

Thu8, for twenty

years they followed Bapoleon's eagles and shed their
blood on all his battle fields in the unflagging hope
that out of his drastic rearrangement of the map ot
Europe a neW and complete Poland would ultimatel,
arise, and the spirit of those years did bear fruit
again and again.
Wherever a nation struggled for liberty, Polish
knights-errant were sure to be found aD its front
ranks.
In the nineteenth aentury, the partial and halfhearted concessions by which the partitioning powers
at various times met the insatiable desire of the
poles for complete political freedom did not hinder
the nation, through two-thirds of the nineteenth
century, from rising in rebellion again and again.
~o

insurrectionary wars against RuSSia, in

1830-31 and 1863-64, each taxed Russia's huge military

strength to the utmost; and the "springtime of nations"
in 1848, sweeping the Whole of Europe with gusts of
revolutionary movements, had its

stor~

reverberations

both in the Austrian and the German division of poland.

1. Dyboskl, Roman,

~

CIt., p. sa
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If, howeTer. the cause of poland failed to
reoeiTe actiTe support trom Western European Powers
at oritical and crucial moments, the riSings.
neTertheless, achieTed one end: They kept the poliah
iasue alive in Burope's international politica, ant
did not allow it to aink to the insignificanoe of •
merely looal and provinoial matter.
poland's greatest poet, Adam Miokiewios. writ ins
for the comfort and pleasure of his fellow exiles i.
paris a book of parablea, admonitions. and propheoies
in Biblical prose, oalled!!! BoOks!!
lation!!!

~!!!

!!! _po~l_i_s_h

Polish PilgrimsI' (1833). had ended

it with a Pilgrims' Litany oontaining a prayer to
Go4, "for a great war whioh would bring deliveranoe
to oppressed nations."

1

And, indeed. as the nineteenth

oentury was draWing towards its oloae, it seemed that
little Short of the terrible fulfillment of Mickiewioa'
inspired prayer could bring the Polish oause baok to
life.

forty years after Poland's last armed riSing,

the poliah problem, as an issue of international
politics. seemed thoroughly dead and burie4.
France, Which had often manifesteel a sympathetic
and friendly interest in Polish national aspirations,

1. Dybo8kl, Roman.

OPe ~, p.
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now, after her defeat of 1870-71, had sought
security in an allianoe with Tsarist Russia, which
implied the tacit abandonment of the largest seotion
of Poland to Russian oppressio..

Austria, which

for cogent reasons had allowed self-government to ita
Poles, was drifting into greater dependenoe on her
powerful German ally.

Germany, herself, was

.a

determined as ever to suppress Polish nationality
within her bordera.

Her endeavors in that respect

went exaotly parallel to Russia'S and it seemed that
whatever other differences might arise between them,
Berlin and st. petereburgh would always eee alike on
the question of poland.
In poland itself, not only had the interests of
the three divisions of the oountry oome to diverge
widely fro. eaoh other, but the generation groWing up
sinoe the last armed struggle of 1868, had beoome too
absorbed in the pursuit of the material ends of
modern economio effort to retain a vivid sense of
the reality of national aims.
The land-owning gentry. which had been the backbone
of reSistance to foreign rule in previous uprisings,
now profes8ed aoquiesoenoe, and actually evolved a
politioal programme of reoonoiliation and threefold

r
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l07altr,even under Prussia, where it was engaged
in a struggle for the land, that class never thought
of any but legal weapons in the oontest.
fhe manufaoturing and oommeroial oommunities
in all three seotion8, but partioularly under Russia,
had exoellent reasons to oling to the oonneotion With
large imperial organism8.
!he peasantry, for the most part national17
unawakened, always essentially oonserTative, and now
bent with might and main upon the aoquisition of more
and more land, naturally oould not be expeote, to
pur8ue what 8eemed the ohimera of national reunion
and freedom.
Under the oiroumstanoes it was only the professional
intelligentsia of the towns -- that 01as8 of determinins
importanoe for all spiritual movements in latter-day
oontinental Europe

whioh kept the torch of national

aspirations burning. 1
In 8pite of all preparatory aotivitie8, the
declaration of war in August, 1914, opened up for the
poles a

gloo~

and agonising prospect.

!hey saw

themBelves herded together in the ranks of the German,
Austrian, and Russian armies, about to be hurled againat

1. Dibosii, Roman, .Qh CIt., p. '1
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eaoh other in fratricidal strife, brother pitted
against brother, and both against their mother oountry.
Four years of varied horrors followed.
invasions and

counter~invasion8.

Four years of

of armies moving baok

and forth and systematioally ravaging or robbing 8a
they moved; four years of terrible isolation from .11
friend8 and four years of ignorance of what was gOiDi
on in the outside world.
What hope was there for the Poles in such a war?
What oould they see but continued subjeotion to others?
If the Central powers should win, Russia might be
compelled to give up her Polea, but who would get them,
if not the Austrians and the Germans?

If Austria ani

Germany should lose, would not the outcome be merely
the reverse. subjectioa to RU8sia instead of to
Austria and Germany?
To be 8ure, throughout the war, the one side or
the other tried. a8 its fortune. waned or waxed for the
moment, to lure the Pole8 to hearty

oooper~tion

against

its enemie8 by promising them a restored and united
Poland in the end, but these promises were alway.
vague and fleeting, always qualified by some ambiguity
or reservation that rendered them nUll. Or nearly so,
in the eye. of the Poles whose experience in the past

r
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with the triple bank of oppressors did not lead the.
to repose an unlimited confidence in them now.
But unanimous a8 was the opinion of the publio
generally regarding the justice of the polish cauee
among statesmen and politicians. the idea was scarcely
les8 general that from a practical standpoint the cause
was hopeless.

The only hope for the Poles in the

great war was that both side •• Russia on the one hand.
and Germany and Austria on the other, should come out
of it '.feated.

But such a hope could not be

reasonably entertained, so preposterous it eeemed •
• eTerthelesa. the preposterous happened.
Russia wae defeated by the Oentral Powers and
was compelled to sign the treaty of Brest-Lito.sk.
The Oentral Powers were defeated by the Allies and
oompelled to sign the Versailles and other treaties.
The ground was oleared for a new struoture, and one
more substantial and more comfortable for its oocupant.
than that whose unoertain and shadowy plan had, durine
the war, been dangled before them at Tarious timea by
their oppressors.
It

W8S,

howeTer, the Russian ReTOlution which was

to exercise a deoisiTe influence on the oounsels of
the Allies and on the destinies of poland.

It did so

80.

eTen in its first stage, while it still seemed that
ohanges would be moderate and Russia would hold out
in the ranks of the Allies.

!he ProTisional GOTernment

of the reTo1utionary period issued on Karoh 30, 1917.
a manifesto to the Polish nation, recognising its right
to politioal iDdependence. l Although thi. oontained
an allusion to some sort of union between the new
poland and Bussia, it was justly hailed by Polish
opinion as a highly important and further step in the
direotion of deliveranoe.! A beginning bad been made
by Russia

her~elf

With. thorough readjustment of ag.-

old relations established by oonquest.
ETen before the manifesto of revolutionary .
Russia. the voioe of Amerioa, a power still neutral
at that time. but soon to be a determining faotor
in the European

struggle,~8d

subject of Poland.

rung out olearly on the

President Wilson, in a measage

to Congress foreshadowing Amerioa's .possible share
in the conolusion of the peaoe, had deolared that a
reunited and free Poland was one of the war aims admitted
Oil

all 8ides. 3
It was also before the Bussian manifesto that

1. Dybosi!, Roman,

2.
8.

p. 76
'isher, H. H., Amerioa and the New poland, p. 96
George, David Lloyd, ieiitrs of~e Peaoe Conferenoe,

p.630
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K. Dmowski had submitted to Balfour a memoir
embodying his own and his fellow workers' ideas
on the territorial composition of a reconstructed
Polish State -- ideas which essentially remained his
programme when he afterwards represented poland at
the Peace Conference.
It was, on the other hand, under the encouraging
impression produoed by President Wilson's utterances
and by revolutionary Russia's ·recognition of Polish
claims that the Austrian Poles on their part, now
ventured to state national aima more frankly than
had ever been done before in the Central Empire.

A

. resolution passed by the Austro-Polish parliamentary
Deputies assembled at Cracow in May 1917, expressly
defined a complete and independent Poland as the goal
of national aspirations.

It was also in this resolution

that Austria was for the first time treated by her
Polish subjects not

8S

a proteoting Power, but as an

Ally, whose servioes were only welcome if helpful for
the attainment of the clearly defined national aims.
fhat such an unprecedented note should have been
struck, was rendered possible not only by the turn
which affairs had taken in Russia, but also by a recent
happening unler the Austro-German occupation.

The

r
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question of drawing upon the occupied territory
of former Russian poland for recruits was becoming
an acute one for the Central Powers.

It waa

cautiously proposed to widen the framework of
Pileudski's Legions (Poles organized by Joseph
Pilsudski to aid Austria) so as to create a larger
Polish armed force which, however, would at the same
time be more unreservedly at the disposal of the
Central Powers for their war aims.
Pilsudski, at this critical pOint, parted compsn,
with the Central Powers to whom he had always profeased only conditional allegiance.

He forbade hie

loyal followers to take the new military oath
required of them and refused it himself.

His faith-

ful legionaries were disbanded and interned and he
himself imprisoned in the fortress of Magdeburg.
fhis imprisonment added considerably to his prestige
in the eyes of the nation; it raiaed him to the
dignity of a symbol of national resistance to foreign
rule. 1
France now at last saw her way to authorize and
aSSist the formation of a Polish ar., for the Allied
aide, and shortly before the close of the War on
1.

risher, H. H., ~ Cit., p. 100
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Jul7 I, 1918, poland was raised b7 a decision ot
the Allied statesmen at Verssilles to the raak ot
a belligerent Allied nation.

The Polish .ational

Committee in paris was thereb7 recognized in the
Allied camp as an official representation of the
polish people.
While the War 7et raged, long before the Peace
Conference opened, the problem of Poland had been
envisaged from a

.

ve~

different angle by the Allies

to that of the partitioning Powera.
As early as

Ma"

1917, as we

ha~e

observed,

the attitude of the Poles themselves was defined
b, the Polish members of the Austrian parliament
who declared that "the desire of the Polish natio.
was to have restored an independent and united poland
with access to the sea."l
aore important, because it had more foroe
behind it, was the opinion of the Entente powers,
who.e tim1dit7 i. this matter, as in

man, others,

had been pronounced but was now beginning to

cata~

up with the posSibilities and requirements of the
situation.

Russia'S western Allies bad &1ways

observed diplomatic silence on the Polish qUestion,

1. 'iaher, !. H.,

§ii cit.,

p.
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and censored all unofficial allusions to it.

In

1910, Italy was the first among the Allied Powers
to raise its Toice in behalf of the tree Polan'_

1

On November 16, 1916, the Clar of all Russia
himaelf, announced his intention of establishing
pol8.Ild, including RU8sian poland, Galicia and posnania, as an autonomous and united kingdoa Withi.
the RussIan Empire.
On January 6, 1918, David Lloyd George, statine
that he was speaking "for the nation and Empire

&S

a Whole," declared that "an independent poland,
comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who
deSire to for.. part ot it, is an urgent neoessity for
the stability of Weatern Europe."2
»ut, perhaps, the best and clearest statement

ot the aspirations and determination of the Allied
and ASSOciated nations at war was giTen by Woodrow
Wilson in an address to a joint sesBion of Congress
on January 8, 1918.

In this discourse, the President

enunciated his famous "fourt.en Points."

!he

thirteenth point stated that, "An independent polish
state Should be erected whioh should inolude the
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish
~ Cit •• p. 96
George, DaTid LlO;Jd, Op. ~, Vol. II. p. 630

1. 'lsher. !. H.,
2.
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populationa, which should be assured a free and
seoure access to the sea. and whose politioal and
eoonomic and territorial integrity should be
guaranteed by international covenant.·l Several
times throughout the year of 1918, president Wi180R
reiterated in one form or another the main view8
expressed in this prograa.
In the two months between the middle of September
and the middle of November, 1918, the two Empirea whioh.
sinoe 1916. had held all the Polish lands, toppled in
defeat and revolution.
!he events and negotiations whioh Signaled the

defeat of the Central powers and their recognition
of Polish independence may now be briefly enumerated.
On September 16. 1918, the Government of the Dual
MOnarchy asked the president of the
a statement of terms of peaoe.

Unite~

state. for

On Ootober "

the newlJ

apPOinted German Imperial Chanoellor. prince MaX of
Baden. proposed the conolu8ion of a general aratstice.
In his note, prinoe Max requested the president of the
united states to take steps relative to the restoration
of peaoe, to notify all belligerents of the request,
and to invite the. to delegate plenipotentiaries for

1. Seymour. Charles.

~ ~.

Vol. IV, p. 200
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the purpose of taking up negotiation••
!he note further stated that the German Government accepted as a basis for the peace negotiations.
the program laid down by the President of the United
states in his me a sage to Congress of January 8, 1918.
and in his subsequent pronouncement •• particularly
in his address of September 87. 1918.

In order to

avoid further bloodshed, the German Government
requested the President to bring about the immediate
oonolusion of a general armistioe on land. on water,
and in the air.

1

The note also stated that the German Government
believed that the governments of the powers assooiate4
with the United States likewise aooepted the position
taken by President Wilson in his address.
We may thus observe that Germany and Austria
Hungary agreed to the resurreotion

o~

the independent

poland With a free and seoure accesa to the se., in
her preliminary negotiations for an armistice.
The Pole a interpreted theae requests for an
armistice on Wilson'S terms as recognition of their
independence and proceeded to set up their own
temporary government in the place of those of the

1. rIsher, ft. H.,

OPe

Cit., p.

114
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Central Powers.
On Ootober

a,

the Regency Council at wars ••

issued a manifesto dissolVing the Council of state
that bad been elected under German auspicea and
prepared to aummon a popularly eleoted diet
Constitutional Assembly.

88

the

About the same time the

authority which the Central powera had exercised
aince 1915 in the Congreas Kingdom was relinquished.
On November 3, 1918 at Warsaw, poland waa
declared a Republio.

No improvised government set

up in poland was recognised by the Allies, but in
pariS, the Polish

~ational

Committee, which oontrolled

no polish territory, en30yed Allied recognition as the
representatives of the polish nation.

1

Yortunately for poland the German revolution
released from the fortress of

~gdeburg

the man who

through the exigencies of the war had become the most
popular leader of the soldiers and the Dasses of the
people.

Joseph Pilsudski arrived in warsaw on

Bovember 10, and his arrival marked the beginning of
a centralization of authority_

On the day of Pi1sudBki'a

arrival in warsaw the Regenoy Counoil solemnly declared
the German ocoupation at an end.

1. riaher, fi. H.,

~

Cit., pp. 116-1'

r

88.

On the day the Armistioe was signed Polish
offioials took OTer the exeoutiTe functions in
Warsaw, and the Regenoy Counoil placed the supre..
military authority in the hands of Pilsudski.

The

Regenoy Counoil did not long surTiTe the German
authority whioh had oreated it, and on NOTember 1'.
it submitted to popular demand and resigned.
Comma.nder in Chief

0

The

f the .lrI07 beoame Chief of the

polish state.
By this time the Poles were diTided into two
groups of almoat equal strength, neither of Whioh was
willing to submit to the other, nor strong eaough to
foroe its will on the nation.

The Polish National

Committee in paris, was headed by K. Dmow8ki and
dominated by the Bational Demoorats.

This

co~ttee

oontrolled the polish Army in Yranoe, now oommanded
by Haller. and it also enJoyed the oonfidenoe of the
Great powers Whoae representatiTea were gathering i.
paris to redraw the frontiers of Europe.
On the other side, PilsudSki, the hero of the
ma8se8 was installed in Warsaw.

His personal prestige

with the masses was greater than that of any leader
on the other side and at hi8 baok was an armJ rapidl,
growing in nUDbers and organization and intensely loyal
to hi..

But Pilaud8ki ' S position was weak where that

r
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of hiB rivals was strong.

His service in the foroes

of the Central powere had not been forgotten by the
Allie8 and more damaging, perhaps at this time, were
hiB sooialist opinions and his long revolutionarJ
oareer.

Bolshevism had suoceeded

~eutonism

as the

great bogey of Western opinion, and Bolshevism was
an inolusive term making Sooialists of all oomplexions
suspects.
Joreign rule had been broken, but poland was still
divided.

Division meant weakness; union, strength.

lJe8k.ness and division were not the right kind of wares
to display before the all-powerful Allies, who were
then assembling at paris to fashion among other things
a new Polish world.

~o

escape disaster, and to profit

by the independenoe won at such cost a8 roland had
paid, it

W8.S

necessary and imperative for the poles to

patch up a political unity which would make it pos8ible
to utilize the prestige and ability of Pilsudski in
poland and of Dmowski e·nd padereYski in pari s.

Under

these circumstanoes, a compromise wee made by which
the Moraozewski Ce.binet resigned and paderewski became
premier and Joreign Minister on uanuary 16. 1919. with
a cabinet representing the different parties and also
the different divisions.
paderewski's assumption of Premiership is B

r
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landmark in the history and restoration of poland.
!he new state was able to present a united front at
the Peace Conference, Which had its first sesaioa
in paris two days after the neW cabinet assumed
office, and was represented by her Prime Minister .one of the most notable and influential personalitiea
at that historioal gather1Dl.

r

CHAPTER III
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

CHAPTER III

THE PEACE CONFERENCE
The Treaties of paris oonstitute the greatest
measure of national liberation of subject nations
ever aohieved by any war settlement on reoord.

The

Peace settlement meant the bringing of freedom to
many million of Poles.

It waa by no means a simple

task to determine the borders of the neW state.

The

diffioulty of applying the idea of nationality was
inoreased because the boundaries of "historio Poland"
fluotuated from generation to generation and often
inoluded large areas where the population was not
polish by raoe and language.
The Peaoe Conferenoe summoned the representatives
of poland before it on January 18, 1919, and by so
doing formally reoognised the neW Polish 8tate.
poland was given two votes in the Conferenoe.

polan'

was represented by K. Dmowski and I. J. paderewski
with CaSimir Dlusk1, a Pilsudski appOintee

8S

an

alternate.
Kpwever. the reoognition of the Polish state di4
not determine the very important matter of what
territory the neW state was to oontain.
memories of

Theae

Greater poland were destined to give

8

,

.
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trouble to those who sought to settle national
boundaries on ethnological and tradit10nal principles.

When the Poles presented their olaims to

the Conference. the1r claims were by every canon
of self-determination extravagant and inadmissable.
M. Dmowski's conceptions of the reconstruotion
of poland were known to the Allies trom his memorandum
addressed to :Balfour in 191'1.

True to his pre-war

view that Germany was the most dangerous enemy of
poland. Dmowski 1a1d stress on a maximum of territor1a1 acquisitions on the western side of poland.
wh1ch would insure poland's economic and strategical
independence as against GermSD7. 1 Not content
accordingly with the recovery of the province of
the poenania. lost through the partitions, he desired
to see Poland's historical access to the sea by
Danzig safegnarded through the poesession of a wide
stretch of territory on both banks of the lower
Vis tula , including if pOSSible, poland's Bometime
Tassal state, the province of East Prussia.
He wished to see Poland's economic development
in the direction of industrialization placed on a
firm basis by the incorporation of 8ileeia. which
1.

-
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had been separated from poland sinoe the fourteenth
oentury, and inoluded in prussia sinoe the middle
..

1

of the eighteenth oentury.

On the eastern side,

on the other hand, he was prepared to saorifioe •
large portion of the borderland pos.essions inoluded
in poland before the partitions partly beoause they
were inhabited by non-Polish population whioh had
sinoe reaohed a troublesome degree of national
oonsoiousness of their own, and partly also beoause
he Wished to leave the door open for a future
understanding with RUssia. 2
K. Dmowsk1'. Views in this, as on most other
pOints, were fundamentally different from those of
Joseph Pilsudsk1's and his politioal allies who
oontinued to see in Russia the prinoipal danger to
poland's existence.
Pilsudski inherited with the blood of the
eastern borderland gentry from whioh he bad sprung,
a vivid sense of the great historical tradition of
poland's imperial union with her eastern neighbor,
Lithuania, and of poland's oivilizing mission in the
Lithuanian and Ruthenian border countriea.

l.
2.

!emperley, H. W. V., ~ cit •• p.
Dyboski, Roman, 2E.:. £lli. p. 83
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programme was, accordingly, more extensive and
ambitious on the eastern than on the western
aide.

Pilaudski imagined the eastern borderlands

constituting a series of small buffer statea
between Russia and poland, which would be a
superior civilization if Poland gradually CoUld
be drawn into some sort of federative union with
them.
On the western side he would have remained
satisfied with the restitution of her Polish-German
frontier as it existed before the first partition in
1772.1

If, now, we compare the settlement actually

effected by the Peaoe Treaties with these two
different Polish conceptions of it, we observe that
the solution given to the Polish problem by the
peacemakers of Versailles waa, like their solution
of many other European questions, necesaarily
somewhat hasty and accordingly unaatisfactory.
On January 29, 1919, M. Dmowski presented the
territorial claims of poland.

In settling the

boundaries of Poland, he said poland would not be
aatisfied With the historical boundaries ot 1772 in
the West.

'or example, Silesia had been lost to

1. Dybosii, Roman, Op.

~t

p. 83
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Poland since the fourteenth oentury, but toda,
ninety per oent of the population, owing to the
national revival, had kept its language and was
strongly Polish.

He

re~rked

that the whole

territory of Eastern Germany was not naturally
German but was Germanised.

He quoted Bulow

8S

saying that what Germany had lost in the west in
the breaking up of Charlemagne's empire, she had
gained in the east.

Summing up the question of

what is, or what is not, Polish territory, he
suggested that a rough definition would be that
such territory

a8

had been oppressed by Anti-

Polish laws was Polish territory.

1

He went on· to say that if the ooast belonged
to one nation and the land to another, there would
be mutual tendencies to conquest, and quoted Herr
Bebel as saying that Germany's task waa not to
colonize Afrioa, but to colonize the Vistula region.
He maintained that it would be more just to expose
a small Germani.ed country to infiltration by Poles,
than to deprive all P?land of economic independenoe
and to expose it to German aggression.
The Conference at paris manifested so far
1.

George, David Lloyd,

~~.

p. 632

8S
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the boundary between Germany and poland was ooncerned two main tendenoies in the discussions
aooording to its official historian.
The first tendency was based on the idea
that friends should be strengthened at the expense
of enemies. and that the innocent should be
strengthened at the expense of the guilty.

It

showed a leaning in all doubtful cases to give
the benefit of the doubt to poland.
!he seoond tendency rested on the principle
of doing justice to enemies

88

well

88

friends.

On the whole. the seoond tendenoy in most instances
prevailed, Mr. Temperley maintains, and especially
so in dealing with Danzig and the Polish Corridor. l
So far as the frontiers with Germany were concerned.
strategic considerations were for the most part
oompletely ignored.
It may be added that in regard to regions whioh
had been taken away from poland by great international
wrong and crime and Germanized by unique and shamefully
political methOds, it was neither unreasonable nor
unjust to give poland the benefit of the doubt in
1.

Temper1ey, H.

w. v••

.2l?:. .Q.!i.:.. p. 241
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oases where doubt really eXisted.
In the attempt to secure justice as between
nation and nation, it was agreed that nationality
must be the chief basis of settlement.

It was

equally agreed that economic factors might override the faotor of nationality.

History was not

and oould not be ignored altogether.

Religion waa

taken into acoount, but mainly in a negative way.
The Poles demanded that the ethnographic criterion
ahould be the determining factor, and that where it
was necessary to modify the ethnographic frontier
because of economic, historical, or other considerationa that modification should be to the advantage
of Poland.

1

They interpreted the ethnographic

frontier strictly as inoluding all regions in which
Poles by race and language were in & majority, and
they were inclined to assume that Polish race and
language implied

~n

all cases a Wish to be united to

the new Polish state.
In addition they went considerably further than
the Entente powers in their desire to modify the
ethnographic frontier to their own advantage for
I.

'emperIey, H.

w. v.,

~

Cit.,

p. 236

eoonomio and other reasons.
Perhaps in oertain oases they asked for more
then they really expected to reoeive and sometimes
damaged their position by asking too muoh.
~he

deoisions lay with the Peaoe Conferenoe as

a whole, but primarily with the prinoipal
Assooiated Powers, the United states,
Japan, and Great Britain.

~he

~llied

~ranoe.

and

Italy.

deoisions were in all

eases unanimous.
On the oentral point all the Powers were agree4
that it was necessary to establish a polish state and
with it a real ohance of existenoe, that is a state
with the greatest possible stability and strength.
Opinions differed only in the manner in whioh poland
oould be made most strong and most stable.
!he

~renoh

aim at the Peace Conferenoe was a

peaoe of seourity.

France was consoious of a German

menaoe whioh threatened both her and poland alike.
She was not, howeyer, unoonsoious of the diffioulties
involved nOr did she wish to go as far as the poles
themselvea. l
!he CommiSSion whioh the Conferenoe apPOinted On
polish affaire, headed by M. Jules cambon, a Frenohman,

I. femperley, H. w. V.,

~

CIt., p.

238

leaned strongly toward the Franoo-polish view on
disputed pOints.

In the report Which it submitted

to the Supreme Counoil toward the end of Karoh, it
feoommended that Poland be given the greater part
of Posen and Upper SileBia, a broad corridor to the
Bea along both banks of the Vistula River, and the
city of Danzig.
It was indioated in the first report of the
Cambon OomDdssion that the drawing of a frontier
line on

8

purely ethnological basis was almost an

insuperable difficulty.

Economic and strategio

requirements had also to be taken into account in
drawing boundaries in order that the new state thus
delimited should have a fair chance of surviving.
The real cause of the death of Poland. s&i4
K. cambon. was not merely its faulty political
organization, but principally its lack of communioation with the sea.

The real end of poland did not
oome in 1772, but in 1743, When Danzig was lost. l

Without that port Poland oould not live.

By it alone

oould Poland have aooess to liberal powers in the
west.

It was no use setting up a poland deprived of

access to.the sea, as it would inevitably be the

1. George, David Lloyd,

~

Cit., p. 639
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prey of Germany or of a reoonstituted Russia.
poland must have not only a sea-board, but also
full and free oommunication with Danzig.

If he

had to choose between protecting German populations largely imported Since the eighteenth oentur.J.
and protecting Poles, he unquestionably preferred
the latter alternative.
fhe Amerioan aim at the Peace Conference, aa
was Shaped by her President and voioed in his
public addresses
conciliation.

w~s

for a peace of final world

He held up the banner of the ideal.

President Wilson was enthusiastically proPolish.

In the Peace Conferenoe he sympathized

strongly with Polish aspirations.

But he told Ray

stannard Baker on April 7 that, "the only real
interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany
by giving Poland territory to whioh she has no
right."l
American delegates had displayed very early
marked interest in the matter of PoliSh independence,
and. like France, had historio tieS with poland.
regards the frontier With Germany, the
1.

~ric8ns

Baker. Ray Stannard, 'ooAro. tl1son and World
Settlement. Vol. II. p. 60
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were, like the British, oonsoious of the halard
of including too many Germans in poland.
In the later stages of the negotiations, the
Americans displayed more reluctanoe before acoeptiag
further modifioations introduced by the British.
The British aim lay somewhere between the other two,
a practioal peaoe combining conciliation and seourity,
punishing Germany without orushing her, improTlng the
world, but not seeking all at once to aohieve the
millennium.

1

The British were most consciOUS of the i.expedienoy of inoluding large numbers of Germans
within the polish frontiers and were the prime movers
in the direotion of diminishing the number of Germane
in

the neW Polish nation.

2

Lloyd George was against poland annexing a oity
of Germans -- against it also for the sake of poland.
"We must set up a Poland that can live," he said. "If
awollen by enemy populations she will explode from
within, Danlig is outside the real orbit of poland,
make it international."

President Wilson supported

him; M. Clemenceau was persuaded; and Mr. Lloyd George
i.
2.

8pender, Haroid, The Prime DInlster, p. 29i
!emperley, H. W. V. ~~, p. 239
t
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got his way.

1

Mr. Lloyd George wished poland to flourish
&s a self-governing state, but not to enter on its
existenoe by inflioting on others the crime of the
partitions from whioh it had so deeply suffered.
for this reason, in the last stages of the Conferenoe,
he took a strong solitary stand on the demand for a
plebicite that csme up for Silesia.
British Cabinet supported

~im,

The whole

and in the end he

aChieved his purpose.
Such were the main lines of agreement and
divergence where divergenoe eXisted, but it must be
strongly emphasised that only after full discussion
of the principles involved, did the Conference arrive
at its final deoision.

--

1. Spender, Harold, Ope Cit., p. 293
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CHAPTER IV
WHAT TERRITORY SHOULD POLAND INCLUDE?
Why Should Poland be restored to life, - and
to a position in the galaxy of nations?

She bad

been dead so long. why should the political fabrio
of tOday be disturbed by outting out another nation
by a Tery old pattern?
It had been argued with some potency that poland
should be resurreoted because the equilibrium of
Central Europe would be restored thereby. and a sure
and oertain basis for a lasting European peaoe
seouredl

It was alleged that Central Europe had been

unstable and unbalanced since the disappearanoe of
poland; again. Poland should be restored to life,
said the Allies, beoause German expansion to the
East would be retarded or eTen stopped, and further.
that poland should be giTen a new lease of existence
beoause it was right.

ETen the ground cried out

against the injustioes suffered by poland.
Between 1864, the date of the last Polish
insurrection, and 1914, Europe as far as possible
avoided allusion to the Skeleton in the oloset; not
every state had been guilty of murder, but all had

known of it, and none intervened.

When the first

guns were fired in 1914, the oloset door was
shattered and Poland was found to be alive -gagged.
The main faotors whioh heTe preserved Polish
oonsciousnesl were:

the peasants' attaohment to the

soil, the peoples' stubborn deoi8ion to cling to
their language, and their faith in God, their ultrareligious spirit.
poles, they were, and Poles they had remained;
they had lived through years of religious and
national persecution on the part of Russia and
pruslia, and Withstood victoriously Austria's demoralizing polioy of assimilation.

Through years of

torture, of eXile, imprisonment, years of puniShment.
years of expropriation for speaking their own
language and teaChing it to their own ohildren, they
haTe prayed and hoped.

The very perseoutions of

their oppressors made them strong, and during the
iays of this war these very oppreSsors had to admit
that their policy of foroible assimilation had not
only failed. but had had the opposite result from
the one they desired.

All knew that poland had fought a hundred
wars, but not one for oonquest.

All of her wars

had been in self defense, in defense of justioe,
of right, or of Christianit7.

In 1241 at the

battle of Lignia, she threw baok the !artar
invaders, and thereb7 saved Germanr.

In 1683,

lohn Sobieski saved Europe from the ottomaa dominion.
fhe Polish Revolution of 1794 prevented the ooalition
of the autoorats from aooomplishing the defeat of
Franoe.

Through five oenturies poland bore the brunt

of Turkish arma, until ahe won the appelation of
"the Buckler of Ohristendom."
She has warred otten for the liberty of others.
poland has been the oradle of the world's liberaliam.
She oonoluded in 1413, a political union With
Lithuania, an aot of free union proolaiming for the
first time in a dooument of almOst evangelical
beautl, the brotherhood of man. l She was the first
to provide that, unless legally convicted, no man
should be imprisoned.
In 1208. Poland first applied the elective
franchise. the Polish statute of Wislic&.

In 16'3

1. Gorski, Waclsw D., "fhe Aspirations of poland,"

Outlook ,120 , pp. 628-31, September-December. 1918
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poland inaugurated a virtual republic; ita ohief
magistrate was eleoted fOr life, and oalled a king
but forbidden to lead the militia aoross the frontiers
exoept with the oonsent of the

senate~

And in that

ver7 same year, the year of st. Bartholomew's night,
the Polish Senate provided freedom for all creeda,
the right of every man Within its jurisdiotion to
worship aa he ohoae.
!he Polish exeoutives, the kings. were limited
in their power by an exoessively liberal constitution.
They were laoking in authority while the nation was
deprived of a permanent standing arlD7, and thus an
ea8Y prey to their rapacious neighbors; her fertile
plains known in anoient times as the granary of
Europe, afforded them an added temptation.

1

!he friendly demooratio Entente nations:

the

united 8tate8, England, and France favored the
re8toration of Poland to life and gave her again
a ohanoe to hold aloft onoe more the toroh of
liberalism and to beoome a

bulwar~

against Bolsheviks

and the Germans.
And last, but not least, from 26,000,000 to
36.000,000 poles, speaking the Polish language, in

1.

GorSki, isclaw D., "the ASpirations of poland,"
outlook.120, pp. 628-31, September-Deoember. 1918
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every deoade of history wanted poland restored.
The poles regarded themselves as the chosen people,
ohosen not for viotory, but for suffering.

"poland

was the Messiah among the nations. by whose broken
body and shed blood salvation was to be wrought for
all the nations of the world."

1

As the partitions

of Poland had been the greatest crime of the old
regime. so her resurreotion was to usher in a new
era of peaoe.

From 1770, when a cattle plague

afforded an excuse for the invasions by foreigners,
until poland was restored to a position among the
self-governing nations of the earth by the treaty of
Versailles. there were always efforts being made by
some of the Poles to throw off the yoke placed on
them by the RuSSians, the Austrians, and the Prussians.
But granted that poland was to be restored and
should be restored and to be given a free and secure
acoess to the ses, what was Poland?

What territory

should it have inoluded and what were its proper
boundaries? What criterion should be used in deterDdning its boundaries?

Should the boundaries be

linguistic, cultur81, economio, geographio, or
historioal? poland had been erased from the map

1. Temperiey, H. w.

v.,

~

Cit.,

p.

23'

80

long that it had come to be regarded as a name, a
memory. a cause rather than a country.

1

Now it is clear that the most elementary
justice demanded the 8etting up of a polish atat.
with 80me reasonable ohanoe of life. nor was any
other alternative possible to the Peace Conferenoe,
even if it had been desired.
In determining the territorial allotment of
poland, the Peace Conferenoe considered first
the principle of viability, that is, that a stat.
must have resources. size. and access to markets
to enable it to avoid economic shipwreok.

2

In the second place, there had been general
agreement on the Wilson postulate. that the new
polish state must (1) include territories inhabited
by indisputably Polish populationa, (2) be assured
a free and seoure acoess to the sea, and· (3) b.
guaranteed political and economic independence and
territorial integrity.
leaders, this meant

8.

As interpreted by the Polish
return to the boundaries of

the eighteenth century.3

1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard.
~ ~,

2.
3.

p. 156

Bawman, Isaiah, ~he New World, p. 410
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Many even wished to eee East Prussia included.
It was taken for granted that Danzig would become
a Polish port. All of eastern Galacia was assumed
to be Polish territory, though inhabited large11 by
Ruthenians. All of Upper 8ileeia was considered
eS8ential, in order that the vast resouroes of that
region might be available for rebuilding of poland'.
industrial life.
On the northeast lay Lithuania, and the poles

oould not forget that it was once part of the greater
poland with a long Baltic coast line.

Like other

states of central Europe in post-war years of chaos
and unoertainty in both domestic and foreign affairs,
Poland feared her neighbors and felt that the more
extensive her territory and larger her population.
the greater would be her future securit1f
Geographically, poland is one of the hardest
countries in the world to define.

Clearly marked

natural frontiers ere somewhat lacking or else, whell
they can be discerned they do not coincide with the
historic political boundaries or with present ethnographic boundaries.

The carpathians for instance,

seem to offer an admirable natural frontier on the

i. Bowman. Isaiah,

~

cii., pp. 411-4i2
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80uth; neverthele8S, the boundaries of the old
polish state overlapped this mountain range for
a considerable distance, and so does the poliah
linguistio frontier toda7.
on the north, the Baltio should form the
natural limit of Poland, but historioal17 Poland
had seldom ever held more than

8.

narrow frontage

upon that sea, and tOday the area of Polish-speakiDg
population touches the Baltio only along a short
stretch of coast, the region of the so-oalled
"polish Corridor," the subjeot of this Stud7.
On the east and west no

na~ural

barrier.

whatever are to be found in the vast unbroken plain
Which stretohes across northern Europe from the Low
Countrie8 to the Urals and across ASia to the pacific.

1

It is true that Polish geographers are accustomed
to treat the whole region between the BaltiO, the
Carpathians, the Dvina, and the Dnieper as a countr.r;
to claim for it a high degree of phySical unity With
respect to its structure, olimate, produotions, river
systems, and other features; and to argue that this
entire area ought likeWise to form a political unit,
poland.

Geographic poland thus defined is practicel17

1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard.
~~.

p. 167
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identioal with historioal poland as it was in
its later periods.

1

Ethnographic poland inoludes nearly the whole
of the so-oalled "Congress Kingdom" of poland,
most of the former Prussian provinoe of Posen.
parts of the Prussian provinoes of East and West
Prussia and 8ilesia, and the western part of
Galioia. 2
In addition, there are many Polish enolaves
soattered about in Eastern Galioia and in the
Russian provinoes to the east of the Congress
Kingdom.

There is muoh reason to suppose, however,

that if ever an honest oensus is taken here, the
eastern limits of the Polish ethnographio area
would be extended considerably beyond the boundaries
of the Congress Kingdom.

Historically the name

"Poland" has been applied to a state with very Widely
fluotuating frontiers. 3
The hundred years of Russian rule sinoe the
Partitions and Violent attempts at Russifioation
have by no means destroyed, although they have in part

1. HaSkins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
pp. 157-58
lDId., p. 158
Ibid., p. 159
..........
~~,

2.

3.

.........
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nullified the results of four oenturies of
polonization in the eastern territories.

Even

tOday in Lithuania proper and in large areas of
white Russis and the western Ukraine, the country
gentry and the non-Jewish population of the towns
are predominantly Polish.

1

It would probably be trae that the average
pole has, at the back of his head, the' feeling that
his country i8 not merely the modest area of ethnographic poland, but the whole wide expanse of
historic Poland; poland as it was in 1772, just
before the partitions.

~his

conoeption is based

partly upon the principle that the partitions,

a8

lawless acts of usurpations, could have no legal
validity, so that real Poland still exists within
her frontiers of 1772; partly upon the view that the
lands between the Carpathians, the Baltio, the Dnieper.
and the Dvina possess so high a degree of geographical.
economic, and cultural unity that they deBerve to be
considered as one country.
The wide dispersion of the Polish race, the
divergence between what is ethnically Polish today,
and what was historically, and still is in part

I. RiskinB, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert HOWard,
~ ~,

p. 163
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oulturally. polish, the laok of adequate data
as to the ethnio makeup and politioal gravitation
of so many of the border populations, the lack of
olear out, natural frontiers, suoh are some of the
difficulties in the way of defining Poland's proper
boundaries Or in deoiding what is poland or what
territory poland should inolude.

1

We now pass to more speoific oonsideration of
the so-oalled polish Corridor, the oreation of the
Peace Conferenoe·of paris for the purpose of giving
Poland a safe and seoure outlet to the sea.

1.

Haskins, CharleS Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
~~,

p. 170
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CHAPTER V
THE POLISH CORRIDOR
The wedge-shaped sector of land called the
polish Corridor runs inland from the Baltic Sea
for a distance of 46 mile_across territory Whioh
at the olose of the World war was a part of the
German Empire.

At the ooast it is merely 20 mile_

wite, inoreasing in width to 60 miles at the oenter
and 160 miles at the extreme south.
Geographically, the limits of the Corridor are
hard to fix. for the simple reason that the Germans
themselvea have never set a definite limit to the
territory which they olaim as the Corridor.

In

praotioe, however, it is generally understood t.
include the present Polish provinoe of pomerelia
and the Netse district belonging to the adjoinins
province of posen, that is, the territory taken by
prussia in the first partition of poland, together
with the district now included in the Danzig Free
State.

Thus delimited. it baa an area roughly equal

to that of Massaohusetts and Conneotiout oombined.
and a .populstlon of somewh8.t leS8 than a million and

a half.

65.

Historioally, the region of the Corridor
has been the battle ground of Slav and Teuton for
more than seven centuries.
a Polish Duke of

~.ovia

The struggle began when

invited the Teutonio

Knights to establish themselves on the east bant
of the Vistula River and to undertake the task of
oonquering and converting the pagan Pruss ian. who
were troubling his borders.

This was in the year

1226 and during the next hundred years the Teutonio
Knights established themselves in all the regions
between the Nieman and Vistula Rivers.

Their

capital was at Marienburg on the Nogat.

Onoe

established, however, the Teutonio Order waged
war equally with Pcle and Prussian.

The latter

were presently either assimilated or annihilated,
•

and thousands of colonists were brought from South
Germany to settle this Wilderness.
In the fourteenth century, the Order crossed
the Vistula and repeated its exploits.

Here again.

conquest was followed by colonization.

H~ceforth.

therefore, the population on this left bank of the
Viatula was mixed, while Danzig became what it ba.
always remained, a purely Teutonic town.

In

the

fifteenth century. the Poles defeated the Teutonio
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Enighta at Tannenberg, on the same field where
five hundred years later Von Hindenburg won hia
great victory over the Russians.
Thereafter, the disintegration of the Order
W8S

rapid and the Second Treaty of Thorn in 1466

not onl7 restored the west bank of the Vistula to
poland, along With Danzig, but transformed the
Grand

~ster

of the Order into a vaesal of the

polish throne for the East Prussian Duch7.
In the eighteenth century,

~rederick

the Great

found himself possessed of this prussian DuCh7 whioh
had passed to the Electors of Brandenburg, and hal
thus esoaped from Polish suzeraint7, but was still
separated from hie other dominions by the Polish
Corridor, erected by the Treaty of Thorn.
To abolish this Corridor and establish territorial unity for hiB kingdom, he engineered the Piret
partition of Poland.
The Second and Third partitions extended prussiaa
holdings of Polish territory, and even Napoleon -great friend as he was supposed to be to the poles
in oreatinghis skortlived Grand Duchy of warsaw,
refrained from restoring the Corridor.

~inally

the

Congres8 of Vienna confirmed prussian title to the
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Corridor whioh now became west Prussia, and title
to posen as well, and this oondition endured
thereafter until the olose of the World War.
lrom an historioal standpoint, the Pole. base
their olaim to the Corridor upon original posseasion
and three oenturies of undisturbed oooupanoy between
1466, the date of signing the Second

~reaty

of !horn,

and 1772, the time of the first partition of poland.
!he Germans rest their claim and title to the Corridor
upon the conquest and oolonization by the !eutonio
Knights and upon the century and a half of possesaion
between 1772, the time of the first partition, and
1919 whioh i8 the date of the Signing of the

~reaty

of Versaillea.
Ethnioally, the Situation as respeots the Corridor
is even mOre intrioate as a oonsequenoe of the long
centuries of intermingling.

!hat the territory was

originally inhabited by Slavs before the advent ot
the Teutonic Order now 8eems oertain.

That before

the World war, East Prussia was largely Germanized
and West Prussia partially, is equal17 true.
In 1919, that is. at the moment of the making
of the Treaty of Versailles, the situation was oonfuaed; in fact, all depended upon the area ohosen for
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a test.

Thus in the whole provinoe of prussia

and the Netle district, there was an undoubted
German ma3orit7.

In the region aotual17 take.

from Germany, that is, the Corridor and the nanlig
Jree state, While the margin wae mnoh narrower,
the German advantage was still probably oonolusive.
On the other hand, in the area aotually tranaferred to poland, the Slavs, quite as oertainly,
outnumbered the Teutons.

But even here, the German.

olaim, with justioe, that not all the Slavs are
pol •• , and with far less warrant, that the cassubiane,
living in the Tuohola Heath and farther north oannot
be fairly oredited to their rivals.
These claims and counter olaims remain somewhat
hazy and unoertain beoause they are based on the German
side on Prussian statistios whioh were notoriously
partial, and no plebiscite was ever oonducted.
The Poles had an indeoisive majority according
to Prussian statistios.

On the eve of the World war

there were 990,000 inhabitants.

437,412 were Germane,

448,773 were poles and 104,000 were cashubes, a people

affiliated olosely with the Poles, ethnographioally
speaking.
Koreover, Poland maintained that the ethnographio
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prinoiple oould not be followed too minute17,
beoause the Oorridor was the soene of intensive
oonoentration by German oolonists aided by the
Prussian government.

The German Imperial Coloni-

sation COmmission in thirty years, spent 600,000,000
marks in buying up property in the eastern provinoes
and settling German oolonists upon it, thu8 dispossessing the Poles of a land whioh had been theirs
for a thousand years.
Half a dozen other offioial and semi-offioial
organisations have been at work for the same purpose.
Over 100,000 Germans have been brought in in this
In addition, a host of government funotionarie8

wa7-

and servante estimated to be from one-fifth to onethird of the German population have been brought in
from the outside for the purpose of impressing an
artifioial German oharacter upon a Polish land.

1

The substantial preference Whioh the German farmer
enjoyed gradually foroed out Polish settlers.

It i.

difficult for even the Germane to deny these patent
facts.
The absenoe of a vote was explained by Wilson's
deoision to bestow upon Poland aooess to the sea over

1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
Ope Cit., pp.
-

174-76
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her own territory.

To giTe effeot to this deoision

inTolved restoring the Corridor as it had existed
before the First Partition.

President Wilson's

deoision was based upon the obTious fact that the
new Poland would haTe an area greater than that of
Italy and a population in excess of Spain. and
without free access to the sea, this large area
and its great population would be eoonomioally at
the meroy of Germany, which would hold its natural
sea gates.

President Wilson. too, was profoundly

influenced by what he conceived to be the moral
issues involved in undoing the work of the partitioners.
But the oase of Poland is unique, moreover,
in that it has an ethnic group of indisputable
Polish people. straight through to the sea.

1

Thia

waa the first and the principal reason for the
establishment of this now famous Polish Corridor by
the Peace Conferenoe.
acoess to the sea.
that.

Poland needed territorial

No one would seriously dispute

But it is doubtful that the Peaoe Conferenoe

would have granted her an outlet to the sea where it
1.

Bask1ns, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
~~, p. 178
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was granted had the Oonference not been justified
in its opinion in doing so on ethnographic, as well
as historical and economic ground••
Thus there existed at the time the treaty wa.
made, on the west bank of the Vistula River an
unbroken corridor of Polish-speaking territory
extending through well nigh to the sea.

The Germans

have never bridged successfully this gap between the
old German lands in the West and the isolated
German colony in East Prussia.
Apparently, wisdom and justice guided the handa
that created the Polish Corridor.

If there had been

any good way around it, it might have been an

undesirable arrangement.

It seemed the only solution

to the problem that had any ethnographic reasons for
its creation.

We shall later observe some suggestiona

that have been proposed for a different outlet to
the sea for Poland.

But each of these proposals has

as many or more objections as has the present outlet.
The solution merely restores the territorial
situation that existed here for three hundred yeara
down to the time of the

~irBt

partition in 1772.

Nor

can the continuity of German territory be maintained
without denying Poland acoess to the sea.
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In reality. what we now call the poliah
Corridor appears tOday to have been in some fashion
a German dam strete'hed across the Pomeranian plains,
holding back the Slav tide from the age of Frederick
the Great to that of William II.

But once the dam

had been abolished by the Treaty of Versailles, the
Slav tidal wave swept down the Corridor to the sea
in a vast and irresistible drive which has all but
wiped out the last vestiges of German construction
as today there is a great preponderance of PoleS in
this region.
poland was given then a minimum direct access
to the sea.

The Polish Corridor was intended to

promote favorable commercial contacts between poland
and the industrial and commercial centers of Western
Europe.

Post war developments have made this

irreducible minimum of aooess even more vital to
poland than ever before.

Placed between a Communist

Russie with whom normal trade is impossible and a
Germany who will not buy what poland has to offer,
Poland has been compelled to reorient the direction
of her entire foreign trade.
The main currents of that trade no longer run
between the east and west, but from south to north.

'18.

pOlish imports and exports follow the Vistula
river and show a tendenoy to develop towards the
Baltic nations and the great Western powers, i. e.,
England, Pranoe, Italy and the United states, by
virtue of her sea coast and the possibility of
oommunioation by sea.

poland is a quasi neighbor

of these oountries, whereas, aooording to the
theais suggested by German propaganda, she should
be only a state shut in by the territories of
Germany and Russia.

Britain has beoome an important

purohaser of poland's agrioultural produoe, the
Soandanavian oountries of her ooal, and more distant
oversea lands buy in inoreasing quantities what
oannot be Bold to Polandrs oontinental neighbors.
poland once more, as in the sixteenth oentury, must
be a Baltio power, or not be at all.
one bas then to faoe the simple faot that here
are two nations, one of 65,000,000 (more now in view
of reoent annexation), the other of 32,000,000 faoing
each other over a more or less imaginary line,
mutually resolved to oarry out purposes which are
irreooncilable.

They are actually engaged upon this

tront in a struggle whioh differs from real war
only in the faot that it is oonduoted, not by armies,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------

--

_.

,r

but by all the forces of public opinion and propaganda.

What is most disturbing is that thia

struggle steRdily inflames public feeling, exaoerbates national passion, promotes despair.

!ut the

trouble With the situation is that there can be no
answer as long as Europe and the world remain
dominated by nationalistic sentiments.

For the

problem of the Polish Corridor there are two
solutions: A German and a Polish, but there is no
disposition to compromise at present.

poland insiste

upon retaining an outlet to the sea over her ow.
land, while Germany refuses to endure the isolation
of East Prussia from the Reich.

Without disoussing

more fully such purely domestic German problems, it
must plainly be stated that, in the last resort, the
issue lies between greater Or less economic inconvenience for one German province on the one hand,
and the existence or non-existence of the entire thirtytwo million Polish state on the other.
Poland can pOint to her historical experience in
the

parti~on

period which showed that the annexation

of her sea-side lands by Prussia at the Second partition
in 1793 meant the cutting of the jugular arter3 of her
political-economic organism.

Under the existing

r

oircumstances, German communication with East
prussia by land is at the mercy of poland save
for treaty guaranty; after revision, polish acces.
to the sea would be at the mercy of Germany.
In this situation it is clear that question.
of economic right, race, language and history are
relatively 8ubordinate.

Yet, both the Germans and

poles can fortify their claims by such detail••
fhe Polish state as it exists today, combines in
its larger bulk a number of requirements for an existence
economically 80und as well as politically independent.

1

But it was this very creation of a "greater poland"
which not only entangled the new republic in inevitable
conflicts with almost all her neighbors. but also called
forth remonstrances from among the western European
authors of her restoration.
fhere were writers and publicists of standing
and renown who frequently expressed the opinion that
it was a mistake that poland was re-established in
somewhat like her wide eighteenth-century frontiers,
which once already had been the cause of international
complications and of disaster to the country.
When the treaty was still in draft General Smuts
1.

femperley, H. W. V.

t

~~, Vol.

VI. p. 218
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of South Afrioa warned the Paris Conferenoe that
it had made Poland too strong for the peaoe of
Europe, and advised its ourtailment as a measure
of preoaution while there was still time.
-

A letter of General J. J. C. Smuts to the
Prime Minister, Lloyd George, Kay 22, 1919, critioized
the terms as drawn and suggested changes.

:u.a1 22, 1919
!he Prime Minister
In re GermaD7's Eastern Frontier

I am convinced that in the undue
enlargement of Poland we are not only
reversing the verdict of history, but
cOmmitting a cardinal error in polioy
whioh history will yet avenge. The new
Poland will include millions of German.
and Russians and territories whioh have
a German or Russian population, or whioh
have for very long periods been part of
Germany or Russia. It is reasonably
oertain that both Germany and Russia
will again be great powers, and that
sandwiched between them the new poland
could only be a success with their good
will. How, under these oircumstanoes, can
we expect poland to be other than a failure,
even if she had that ruling and administrative oapacity Which history has proved that
ahe has not? Even now While the conference
is Sitting, the Poles are defying the Great
Powers. What is going to happen in the

".
future with the Great powers diTide4
and at loggerheads? I think we are
building a house of sand. And in
Tiew of the.e and many other con,iderationa, I would reTiae the boundaries of Poland as proTisionall,
settled in the Treaty, leaTe uPper
8ile.ia and all real German territory
to Germ8n7. oontract the boundaries
of the Free City of Danzig, and
instead of placing her under the
suzerainty of poland as we propose
doing leave her under the .uzeraint,
of Germany with an administration
under the League of Nations. I think
the two cardinal errors in policy of
this treaty are the long occupation
of the Rhine, and the enlargement of
poland beyond anything which we had
conteaplated during the war. These
two errorS are full of menace for the
future peace of Europe, and I urge
that eTery means be taken to remove
thea before it is too late. There is
no doubt that the German Delegates are
going to make a stiff fight, perhaps
a condition for signature of the Treaty.
that the settlement of their Eastern
frontiers in 8ilesia, East and West
Prussia, should be revised. I would
advise that we consider the case to be
put forward by thea more oarefu11y on
its merits.

The danger which General Smuts pOinted out had
been antiCipated more than seventy years before by
otto Von Bismark, who saw further than most statesmen
of his century.

As early as 1848. long before he

1. Biker, Ray Stannard, 'ooaro. Illson and toril
Settlement. Vol. III, Document No.

6~pp.

458-465
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entered official life. Bismark acourate17 predioted
the territorial ambitions in whioh poland would
indulge if it were ever to be reconstituted with
the province of posen as a jumping-board.

Then,

he wrote. "She would not rest until it had reconquered
from us the Vistula mouth and every Polish village
in west and East Prussia, pomerania, and Si1e8ia."

1

Germany cannot become reconoiled to the lose
of several large provinoes into Whioh, sinoe she
took them from Poland, she has put a great amount
of organizing effOrt and also of oapital.
It appears that the Corridor is too narrow to
be suooessfully defended against Germany or other
bordering enemies both in the east and the west.

2

It was the wish and hope of the PoliSh leaders at
the Peaoe Conference, that they would be given.
broader stretoh of land than that ocoupied indisputably by Polish populations.
Their hope was based upon the relation of the
polish State to the Vistula River.

For the relation

of the Vistula River to all Poland is that of the

1. Dawson, WIlliam Harbutt, Germany Under the Treatl,
p. 38'

2.

Buell, Raymond Les11e,

~~.

pp. 320-321
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Miasissippi River to the great central region of
the United states.

Since the earliest time this

river has been assooiated with Polish nationality_
They have inhabited its plains for ages.

rrom the

Carpathian MOuntains to the Sea, its banks have
long been bordered by Polish populations.

!hey

have possessed its shores, even if the sovereignty
of the river belonged to someone else.
poland derived economic as well as cultural
and Psychologioal strength from the Vistula in a
higher degree than, for instanoe, Germany does from
the Rhine, the source and mouth of whioh are outSide
of German territory, and the upper

parts of whioh

constitutes the boundary line between Germany and
SWitzerland, and Germany and Franoe.

The Vi.tul.

is in faot, the backbone of poland, her old oapital,
Craoow, her neW oapital, warsaw, and once her only
port, Danzig, are all Situated on the banks of the
Vistula.
The arrangement of the Corridor has been denounoed
by the oritics of the Treaty of Versailles on the
ground that this Corridor outs off Germany from their
East PruBsian PrOVince, and that it is something that
the Germans will never stand for permanently.
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It is alleged that the isolation of East
Prussia effected by the Peace Treaty is unnatural,
unique in the modern world, and ruinous to the
province so separated from the body of Germ&n7.
As against this. it must be emphasized that similar
"Corridors" are not unknown elaewhere; the Canadian
"Corridor" to

Vancouve~

to mention only the instance

most familiar to British and Amerioan readers, haa
never been an obstacle to the development of Alaska
as part of the United states,nor as a cause of enmitJ
has it ever come between the two nations.
With regard to East Prussia. it is a well
established fact that German transit across the
Corridor,

&8

safeguarded by international conventions

and often checked both by official authorities and
private foreign observere. l was facilitated in every
w&7. and POland has never declined to discuss further
extensions of these facilities. But it is pleaded
that East Prussia has suffered gravely in her economic
life through her detachment, and a movement of
emigrations from that province into the interior of
Germany has actually set in.

The German budget is

burdened with large expenditure on "relief to the East,ft
whioh as a matter of fact was largely used for the
1.

Haskins, Chir1ee Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
p. 180

~ ~.
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politioal end of promoting and strengthening
Germanism along the Polish border.
The oompla1nts regarding the economio situation
of East Prussia are not altogether unfounded, but
are certainl7 exaggerated.

The oonditione, desoribed

as effects of the isolation of the province, are
part of the general economio situation of GermaD7
whioh i8 due to a great many factors other thaa the
territorial settlement.

They are also part of the

economic relations of commeroial diffidence or
open "tariff war" now unfortUJJately so general
between European statea.

It is East prussia whioh

standS in the way of favorable trade treaties with
Poland. the agrarian olass-interest of her large
landowners -- a thorough17 reactionary and fanatioally
ne.tionalist group -- being allowed to oarry undue
weight in the oouncils of Germany's rulers.
Should a million and a half or two m1llion of
Germans have rights that outweigh 27,000.000 to
32.000.000 Poles in the Hinterland to a seoure aocess

to the Baltio Sea?l Clearly the Polish interest i.
inoomparably the greater and ought to take preoedenoe.

1. laskins. Charles Homer and.Lord, Robert Howard,
~~.

p. 180

I
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Therefore, very properly, the Conferenoe created
the ·Corridor" for the access of poland to the sea.
poland onoe again, as in the eighteenth oentur7,
may be an obstaole in the way of German aspirations,
and if Germany so strongly resents the existenoe of
the Polish Corridor, it is oertainly not only beoause
the Corridor outs off

E~st

Prussia from Germany, but

because it is a barrier between Germany and Russia.
What Germany wants to effect by the removal of the
polish Corridor is the creation of

8

new and muoh

broader "Corridor" over the head of Poland, uniting
Germany with Russia.

The small Baltic states.

particularly Lithuania, would then serve but as a
oontinuation of a German "Corridor" so conoeived.
It is plain, then, that it is not against the
Polish Corridor as it exists tOday, but against a
polish Corridor, in faot, against an7 and ever7
oorridor to the Baltio that the efforts of Germany
are and will be direoted.
It would be dangerous to the whole European
system for Germany and Russia to be so olosely
united.

If this danger is to be avoided, the

maintenanoe of not only poland as a Whole, but of
her outstretohed territorial arm to the sea, appears

r~

,
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to be a trulr wise and far sighted European polior.
If poland and Europe are to be safe and remain safe.
the Baltio must beoome neither a German nor a Russian
nor & Russo-German lake, but remain & European and
a world lake.
~he

Corridor was oonstruoted at·a moment when

the prinoiple of nationalitr dominated any other
oonsideration.

Whether one judges aooording to the

principles established by the Versailles Treaty, or
aocording to some personal standard, there is one
point upon whioh all have agreed: as a result of the
interdependence of nations so generallr disoussed
tOdar. no oorridor oan remain a trouble maker for
Poles and Germans alone.

Danger of war between two

nations is a danger of war to the world.

This is a

verr good reason everyone should be interested in
the solution of this international problem.
Suggested alternatives.to the Oorridor may be
mentioned to show how unaoceptable they are for
Poland.

The absorption ot the O.orridor together With

Danzig and East Prussia into the body of a reunited
Germany oould, it is said, be compensated to
poland by the right to use all northeastern

German harbors from Stettin to Konigsberg.

But

thoee who haTe a knowledge of present day international conditions must realize that any guarantees
which oould be given for the inviolability of suoh
commercial "rights of way" are worthless in a Burope
deprived of a strong international exeoutive. l
!he 8ame objeotion is made to the idea of
erecting Dansig together with the Corridor, and
possibly East Prussia, into a neutral politioal
unit under international administration.
!he ·Free City" of Danzig alone has caused more
than enough trouble to the League of Nations in the
last twelve year.; a larger territory under international oontrol in that part of the world would
prove much more unmanageable and would only be a
source of constant quarrels and anxietiea.!
There is a third proposal which has been
tentatively broached and i8 favored by some Britiah
atatesmen.

It proposes to return the Corridor and

the acoess to the sea at Danzig to Germany, in return
for whioh, poland should reoeive access to the aea
further east, by way of Kemel, through territory

1.
2.

D;rboskl, Roman, QR.:. Cit.. p. 399
Ibid., p. 399

-
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which is now German.

But this would cause a

violent, unnatural snd entirely impraoticable
twist to poland's whole system of communication.
by 46 degree., a twist that is wasteful and diffioult because the portions of the oountry that need
a direot outlet to the sea such as the Silesian
ooal fields would be then farthest away from the
outlet to the sea.

Then too, the Memel plan would

involve a thorough ohange in poland's relatione
with Lithuania, the re-establishment in faot, of
the historioal union between the two oountries.

1

Lithuania. at present, shrinks at the thought
of a renewal of the union, beoause she fears that
in 8uoh a union her national distinotness would be
endangered through weight of numbers and through
Polish oultural influence.
The paris Peaoe Conference saw fit to make a
most oomplioated and artifioial arrangement for
poland's outlet to the sea.

It took Danzig from

Germany but did not give it to poland.

However.

the oontrol of the Corridor to the sea would be of
little or no advantage without the oontrol of its
natural terminus, the port of DansiS.

1. Dyboaltl, Roman, .2E.:. £!l:., p. "00

Danzig is
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the end of the Corridor, the port of entry and the
port of exit for the Vistula River, the great
river of Poland.

Dan.ig had belonged to the former

Polish state and had greatly prospered as all the
ooean oommeroe of the oountry had passed through
its harbor.

prussia had aoquired it in 1793 in the

Seoond partition, and as late as 1813, the City
Counoil of Danzig besought the Powers of Europe to
reunite Danzig to Poland and not to inoorporate it
with Prussia.

1

Very prosperous and oontented under

Polish rule, Danzig largely lost its prosperity under
the Germans.

The poles, beoause they regarded the

oity as rightfully theirs and also beoause it was
their only outlet to the sea, expeoted that it would
be inoluded in the new state.
The so-oalled "Cambon" Commission, the CommiSSion
appointed by the Conference to make boundary recommendations, deoided on two occaSions after impartial
looal investigation that Danzig should be unoonditionally
alloted to poland.

That it was not, was due to the

opposition of Lloyd George, with whom president Wilson
was persuaded to agree, Clemenoeau aoquiescing, though
unwillingly.

1. Haskins, Charles Homer and Lord, Robert Howard,
~

Oit., p. 181
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~he

reason for not giving Danzig to the pole.

was that Danzig end the region around about, with
a population of about 360,000, was overwhelmingly
German in stook, speech and sympathy. thus it waa
undesirable to

in~orporate

into poland so large •

body of persons who would neoes8arily be a disoontented
and therefore a weakening element in the new stat ••
~he

reason is not impressive coming from men who

lapsed eaSily from the principle here involved in
their settlement of other questions that came before
them.
~yrol

~hree

hundred thousand Germans of the Austrian

were handed over to Italy on strategic grounds

and three million to Czecho-Slovakia on historical
grounds.

The same arguments might have been mad. or

applied to Danzig with greater foroe from the point
of view of Polish national deference and with equal
foroe from that of historioal righto
Although Germany had accepted president Wilson's
fourteen pOintB, the German delegation protested
against the proposal which would give poland aoceB8
to the sea, and insisted that the sea ooast. Danzig,
and the mouth of the Vistula River, should remain in
German handa.
~he

German protest was rejeoted in the well-known
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letter of Clemenoeau, president of the Peaoe
Conferenoe, dated June 16, 1919, and in the enolo.e'
note:
-The reply of the Allied and Assooiated Powers
to the observations of the German Delegation on the
Conditions of peaoe. l
"poland will be given oertain economic rights
in D&nsig and the oity itself bas been severed from
Germany beoause in no other way was it possible to
provide for that free and Seoure access to the sea
which Germany has promised to concede.
-The German oounter-proposals -- deny seoure
aooess to the sea to a nation of over thirty-two
million people, whose nationals are in the majority
all the way to the coast, in order to maintain
territorial connection between East and west Prussia,
whose trade has always been mainly sea borne.

They

oannot, therefore, be accepted by the Allied and
Associated Powers.The relevant passages in the Allies' reply read
as follows:

"Section IX -- East Prussia -- for poland --

For Poland to have immediate and unbroken oommunioation
With Danzig and the remainder of the coast by railways

1.

--------
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Slowski, Dr. Stanislaw, poland's Aocess to the Sea,
-----p. 5
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whioh are entirely under the oontrol
state is essential.

0

f the Polish

The inoonvenienoe o8usec1 to

East Prussia by the new frontier is nesligible
oompared to that whioh would be oaused to poland
by any other arrangement.
"Seotion XI. Danzig, -- The eoonomio interests
of Danzig and poland are identical.

lor Danzig as

the great part of the valley of the Vistula, the
most intimate oonnection with Poland is essential.
The annexation of west Prussia, inoluding Danzig,
to Germany. deprived poland of that direot aooe88
to the sea whioh was hers by right.

The Allied and

Assooiated powers propose that this direot aooeS8
shall be restored.
"It is not enough that poland should be allowed
the use of German ports; the ooast, short 8S it ia,
whioh is Polish, must be restored to her.

poland

olaims, and justly olaims that the oontrol and
development of the port whioh is her sole opening
to the sea shall be in her hands and that the oommunioations between it and Poland shall not be subjeoted
to any foreign oontrol, so that in this, one of the
most important aspeots of national life, Poland
should be put on an equality With the other states

r
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of Europe."

1

A olause in Artiole 89 provides that Poland should
guarantee free transit between Germany and East Pruseia.
In aooordance with this provision and in exeoution of
Artiole 98 of the Treaty of Vereailles, a po11sh-German
convention was oonoluded in parie on April 21, 1921.
The said convention oame into foroe as from Jttne 1922,
and i8 be1ng oarried out by Poland to the complete
satisfaotion of Germany's transport and eoonomio needa.
poland's acoese to the sea, in a geograph10al and
territorial sense, is formed by the Polish ooastal
terr1tory.
The pr1noipal stipulat10ns of the Treaty of
Versailles and the paris Convention oonoluded between
Poland and Danzig and dated November 9, 1920 are the
follow1ng:
(a) Danzig is a Free City under the proteot1on
of the League of Nat1ons.
(b) Danzig is included 1n the Polish frontier,
in so far as oustoms and duties are ooncerned.
(0) Poland oonducts DanZig's fore1gn relations.
(d) The railway system and its control are give.
to Poland.

1. S1awski, Dr. stanis!aw,

~

Cit., p. 6

91.

(e) Poland has the right to establish in
the port postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
communioation with Poland on the one hand
and with foreign countries on the other.
(f) Besides the above mentioned convention,
the juridical basis of the Free City of
Danzig is to be found in its constitution,
elaborated in conjunction with the High
Commissioner of the League of Nations. who
permanently holds office in Danzig, and
who, in the first instance arbitrates in
all disputes which may arise between poland
and the 'ree City of Danzig.
(g) The Polish minority in Danzig shall enjoy
the same protection as national minorities enjoy
in Poland.
(h) !he exploration and management of the
port. that part of the Vistula which flow.
through the territory of Danzig, the canals
and immovable property formerly belonging to
Germany and Prussia, come under the administration of a mixed governing body consisting
of representatives of Poland and of Danzig,
i. e., "the Harbor and Waterways Board."

At
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the head of this Board are a Polish Commissioner
who represents the Polish GOTernment on the one
side, and a Danzig Commissioner. representing the
rree City, on the other.

~he

Harbor Board must

guarantee to Poland the free uee and service
of the port and means of Communication. ••
stipulated in Article 20, without 8n7 restrictions.
(i) !he Constitution voted by the Constituent
Assembly of Danzig in May 1920 was accepted and
adopted by the Counoil of the League of Nations
after certain modifications had been made.
According to this constitution the Pree City i.
governed by the Senate which is vested with
exeoutive power.
Seven senators are eleoted eTery four years b7
the Lower Chamber. while the other fourteen are
parliamentary senatore.

In 1922 a new constitution

was approved by the League.

The Senate consisted of

ten members containing a president and a vice-president.
In order that a statute may become law, both the
Senate and the Chamber must agree.

!he Chamber now

consists of 72 deputies,l

1. siowski, Dr. Stanislaw, OR.

~,
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The Free City of nanzig did not come into
existence from the time of the ratification of
the Treaty of Versailles but only by virtue of an
additional declaration dated October 27, 1920,
made by England, France, Italy and Japan, on the
strength of Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles.
Acoordingly the Frea City of nan.ig came into
existance on November 16, 1920, and Simultaneously
the Polish-Dansig Convention, Which embodies thl
principal Pclish laws concerning the access to
the eea through the territory of the 'ree City of
Dansig, came into effect.
The only reason why Danzig wss detached from
Germany and made a Free City was the desire to
eecure free accese to the sea for poland.

The fact

that the original decision wae to assign nanzig to
poland is authentic prcof of this desire.

Dansig

is infinitely more alive and prosperous today than
she was before the war, when Hamburg overshadowed
her.

This Ba.ltic trade accomplished Within a fe"

short years, could now be reversed only at the cost
of oomplete economic ruin, and oonsequently of
political destruction, to the entire fabric of the

r

new polish stat..

It is an axiom of Polish public

opinion regardless of the party, that unimpeded
aocesa to the Baltio is a fundamental oondition
of Poland's continued existenoe.
In accordanoe with the Treaty of 'Versailles,
poland received coastal territory Without a port, as
well

8S

oertain rights in the port of Danzig Without

territory.

OWing to the faot that Poland is only

part owner of Danzig port and that she has to oope
with great difficulties connected with the oomplicated
administrative system of the port, she has seen fit
to build with the assistanoe of Frenoh oapital, her
own port at Gdynia.

Of Which faot, the Germans

oonstantly oomplained to the League of Nations and
to others that the neW port is and will be an everlasting menace to Danzig'S prosperity.
The compelling reason for building this new aea
port at Gdynia for Poland was due to the perSistent
disloyalty of Danzig to poland, to her oonstant
evasions of treaty obligations, her organized enoouragement of smuggling on a large soale, and her enmity to
polish interest. l Beoause of the deadlook in economio
1.

Dyboaki, Roman,

~~.

p. 398
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relations with Germany, it was necesaary that the
eea-born trade of roland should be foroibly
deTeloped.

It soon was Tery eT14ent that poland

had enough trade to make Gdynia and Danzig prosperou8
and in 1933 poland agreed that

45~

of its imports

and exports should pass through Danzig.
It is a faTorite Polish story that in 1920
Herr Sohm who is now Lord Mayor of Berlin, but who
was at that time president of the Danzig Senate,
had, after refusing to let the Poles import arms
for their Russian war in 1920, deriBiTely told them
to build their own port on the quick sands of the
fiBhing village of Gdynia.

80 they d1d.

By 1926

Gdynia was able to function and in 1932 its harbor
traffic reached and passed the Danzig 1eTel.

In

1936 it handled more commerce than any other city On
the Baltio 8ea. 1 With the help o~ Irench capital,
s railway was built from the Kattowitz ooal mine up
to Gdyni., and the ooal traffio easl1y diTerte4
from Dansig. 2
The location chosen by the Government for the

1. WOlfe. Henry
2.

..

C., nThe Ghos'E of the Corrlctor, w
Hew Republic, 92:240, 1937
lrikemann, Elizabeth, "poland and Germany Todsy."
Fortnightl,, 144 CHS 138): 304-13 S. 1936
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ereotion of the port i8 ideal; it is looated on
the Bay of puok, a bay which oould hold all the
navies of the world today.

!he depth of the bay

near the shore is thirty to sixty feet, the bed
of the harbor is very good for anohorage and the
entrance is sheltered by the Peninsula of Hel.

All

foreign experts have agreed that Gdynia i8 by nature
fitted for a port.
Does Poland really need a port of her own?
Does she need to own in fee Simple her own sea
board?

DoeS she need or require speoial rights in

Danzig?

Could she not use some of the other ports

of Germany also?

Ie not Gdynia sufficient for her

needs? Are there not many countries which do not
possess sea ooasts or ports and yet manage to exist
very well?

Poland does and no doubt wants to u.e

some German ports.

She is direoting a oonsiderable

part of her exports and imports through Stettin and
Konigsberg beoaus.e of their oommunicational and
geographical location and position.
As owner of the port of Gdynia and part owner
of a port at Danzig, poland can also be a oustomer
in the ports of Stettin and Konigsberg.

But poland's

needs oannot be satisfied by the use of German ports.
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Neither oan Polandts existence nor her political
and economic independence be so reconciled.

poland

could not develop her navigation and foreign trade
out of German ports to the degree she could from her
cwn porta, for there would be the German shipbuilder,
forwarding agent, importer and exporter. who would
step in as a middleman between the foreign merohant
and the Polish producer or importer.
Germany may want Polish commerce to depend on
Germany's caprice and whims.

Germany would be able

to fix her own port tariffs, and more important still,
her own railway tariffs; Poland would be compelled to
pay the tribute imposed, as Germany would have a
monopoly in this respect.

If Poland encounters diffi-

culties in the small port of Danzig in obtaining her
right of free access to the sea, it may easily be
foraeen that, in apite of all agreements, powerful
Germany would soon reduce that access to naught.
The German counter proposal of June 1919 to the
Versailles treaty read, in part, that Germany was
prepared to deolare the ports of Memel, Konigsberg,
and Danzig aa free ports, and to give Poland far
reaohing rights in these ports.
a olient of German porta.

poland would be then

r
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Some nations have no sea coast.

Of the

approximately sixty independent oountries of
the world, only a very small number have no
aooess to the sea on aooount of their geographioal
position.
In Amerioa there are nineteen countries whioh
are situated on the Atlantio or the paoifio Ooeana.
This favorable position of these oountrieS i8 the
80uroe of their prosperit7.

Only Bolivia and

paraguay of the south American countrie8 laok aea
coast.

In Africa, only Abyssinia, and in

~8ia,

Afghanistan, -- the bufter state between India,
PerSia, and Russia Turkestan, have no sea ooast.
Before the war Europe had three countries
lacking a sea coast; two of these were of small
Size and unimportant.

The third, Luxemburg, was

up to 1914 dependent on Germany With regard to
customs and railway union, and is now united to
Belgium, using her ports in aocordanoe with

~rtiole

Forty of the Treaty of Versaillea.
It seems, then, that a seaport owned in fee
simple is indispensable to a nation as large as
polanl.

r
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OHAPTER VI
GERKlI - POLISH RELATIONS SINOE THE WAH
poland'. position on the map of oontemporary
Europe makes poland's foreign policy far more
decisive than we were aooustomed to reali.a.

The

principal aim of the poliah foreign policy was. on
tha one hand, to maintain so far as possible
friendly relations with her t •• mighty neighbors,
Germany and Russia, and on the other, to make
poland strong against any attack.

It should be

remembered also, that the Franco-polish Agreement
concluded January 19, 1921 as wall

the RoumanianPoliah Alliance are still in eXistence. l
8S

poland's foreign polioie. were based on the
simple formula that poland oould rely on no nation
but herself.

Oolonel Beck, poland'S Foreign Minister.

looked with distrust upon the League of Nations, the
promises of the Western democraoies and the multilateral security pacta.

He had no faith whatever in

the word of the Nasis.
And now what is the attitude of Germany toward
Poland looking to the future?

1.

We all know she has

Wolf S., "problems of Mbdern poland,·
Contemporarl Review, January 1939, p.

The
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armed at a terrific pace.

Prodigious numbers of

armed men have been springing up where the dragon's
teeth were sown.

Wbat was it all for?

There waa

no doubt that German diplomacy wished to make the
Peace Treaties everywhere aeem intolerable, and
that it will apeak more loudly and less legally when
backed by the full
under construction.

~.

Navl. and Air Forces now

Wherever the status quo seema

vulnerable there the opponenta of Hitler have reason
to be afraid. l
As to Poland's relationa with Germanl Since 1919
it might be aaid that Germanl baa been brought up on
hiatorl aa it waa taught in the Bismarckian School
with the idea that an independent poland would be a
calamitl.

The Germans could not believe in the

permanence of the atate of things that oame into
being in 1919 on their eastern frontiera.
Kost of the leaders of the Weimar Republio
thought of the new poland as an accident and spoke of her
as a "temporary" state.

One of the main objeotives of

the policy launched at Rapallo was to make that
temporarl period 88 brief as possible.

on assuming

the ambas8adorship to the Soviet Union in 1922.

1. t18kemann, Elilabeth,

~oland and Germany TOd8l,"
Fortnightly ReView. 144 (NS. 138): 304-313
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Count Von Brockdorff-Rantl&D voiced the opinion
that "it might be possible to repair at Mosoow
the damage that had been done at Versailles."
The Weimar Republic strove to prevent the consolidation of Poland in every way possible.

It was

always arOUSing prejudice and opinion against
Poland abroad and causing as muoh trouble to her
as it oould at home.

That tactio undoubtedly

worried Poland, but it did not affect her firm
resolve to stand her ground.

In another direction

it actually was a help to poland.

It stimulated her

business men to take advantage of her outlet to the
.e., hastening the construction of the port of Gdynia
by 1930 with French oapital.

As the ancient bonda

between Ger.many and poland were severed, poland's
economic and politioal independenoe was more and
more emphasiled.
In a letter to the CrOwn Prinoe dated September
7, 1925, stresemann oategorically deolared that

"reotifioation of the eastern frontiers of the Reich,
reoovery of the Polish Corridor and of Danzig, and
alterations in the boundary lines of Upper Silesia ftl

r.

stre.emann, Gustav, His Diaries, Letters, & papers,
Vol. II, p. 501
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were outstanding items in the list of Germany's
territorial demanda.

In 1931 Chancellor Bruning

began applying himself to the execution of that
program.

He sounded out paria, London and Rome

to aee just how fe.r territorial revision at the
expense of Poland could be made acceptable to thoae
capitals. l
As the fear of Germany inoreased,the Polish
Alliances weakened and Poland began a searchiI18
oonsideration of her foreign polioy.
Chancellor Hitler's regime in Germany waa
reoeived with marked reserve in poland.

The Poles

could not gueas how he would set about giving
effect to the first point in his platform whioh
oalled for the "re-entry of all Germans into the
bosom of a Greater Germany."
The advent of Hitler resulted in a new antipolish agitation in Danzig o

Polish soldiers guarding

the military base at Westerplatte in Danzig were
reinforoed on the nights of

~.roh

5 and 6, 1933.

Hitler saw that Poland would not tolers,te any
surprise seizure of DanZig, or of any other plaoe,

1. Bmogorsewski, casimir, "Poland: Free, Peaoeful,
strong,"

Poreign Affairs, July 1939
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and that she would give an energetio answer to
any German move that affeoted the status quo.

He

began to plaoe a halt on the irritations that had
isolated Germany and began to try to ore ate a
healthier atmosphere in German-Polish relations.
Speaking at Konigsberg on May 2?, 1933,
Hitler deolared that, "National Sooialism renounoes
those polioies aiming at a modifioation of natural
frontiers at the expense of other people."
Marshal Pilsudski was the first statesman to
foreoast oorreotly the rising powers of the new
Germany and the signifioanoe of the Kazi movement.
He teared that neither Franoe nor Britain oould be
oounted on to maintain the treaty struoture of
Versailles by foroe of arms.
On January 26, 1934, without oonsulting his
Frenoh ally, Pilsudski negotiated the famous nonaggression agreement with Hitler.

The two oountries

expressed their determination to "base their mutual
relations on the prinoiples oontained in the paot
of paris of August 27, 1928 ••• both governments
deolared that it was their intention to reaoh
direot understanding on problems oonoerning their
mutual relations ••• In no oase, however, shall they

have recourse to force in order to aettle suoh
questiona under dispute."
The deolaratioa was to remain in foroe during
a period of ten yeara, but if neither government
gave notice of its termination 8ix months before
or after this period of time, it was to continue
in effect.

1

By this move Germany made the first dent in
the

~rench

Alliance system, removed the danger of

attack by poland, secured a Shield from Russian
aggression, and was able to conoentrate its foroes
against Austria.

The German-polish non-aggression

paot ended German isolation.

By this agreement, poland was recognized
great power.

&8

a

Having demonstrated its independenoe

of Franoe, it now beoame an objeot of solicitation
by many European powera.
The agreement dispelled the bitternese which had
existed between poland and the German Republic.

The

German campaign for revision of the Polish frontier.
the Polish-German tariff war, and the support hitherto
given by Germany to the minorities within poland came

1. Wheeler-Bennett, Documenta ......
on International
Affair a , p. 424
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to an end or were considerably moderated.
Without fear of attack, poland oould now conBolidate its position in the former German provinces;
momentarily Poland had turned German expansion in
other directions and thereby gained time for
rearmament.

In view of the unwillingness of Great

Britain and France to prevent treaty violation by
Germany, the Polish-German agreement certainly
served the immediate interest of poland.
Poland acquiesced in the Nazification of the
Free City of Danzig, subject to the retention of
oertain economio rights, and this contributed to
the enormous strengthening of Germany.

1

Despite the 193' understanding With German7,
Poland had no intention of breaking off from ita
alliance with France.

When Germany reoooupied the

Rhineland in Maroh 1936, poland offered to mobilize
if France did likewise, but Franoe deolined, thua
confirming Poland'S diagnosis of the European
situation.
When Germany annexed Austria in Karoh 1938,
Warsaw did nothing.
1.

The official view was that

Wertheimer, M. S., "The Bazification of Danzig,"
Fo~elgn Policy Reports, June 1, 1936
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DenubiaB area. were of seoondary importanoe and
interest to poland.

In the midst of the subsequent

CzeohosloTak oriais, poland took what amounted to a
pro-German attitude.
lor the moment, the Mnnioh Conferenoe and ita
aftermath seTerely strained relations between
WarBaw and Berlin.

fhe two oountries seemed to

moTe together when they made an agreement on
July 1, 1938, diverting German ooal purohases from
Czeohoslovakia to poland, and the more important
arrangement of Ootober 17, 1938, by whioh Germany
agreed to grant a .23,000,000 oredit to poland. l
While poland's independent foreign policy,
Whioh reaohed its climax with the Teschen ultimatum,
alienated the west, warsaw believed more strongly
than ever that if Czechoslovakia oould not depend
on help from France, itB own alliance with the Frenoh
had become of little importanoe.

France had

acquiesoed in the Polish partitions at the end of
the eighteenth oentury.

Despite its alliance, Franoe

could do it again.
NotWithstanding the reduction of Czeohoslovakia

1. !uell, Raymond LeSlie,

~

eli., p. 346
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as a result of the Munioh Conferenoe,

80me

poles

profeBaed to believe that they oould oount on the
unilateral promiBea of Hitler not to menaoe their
own oountry.

Others believed that German expansion

would oontinue in the direction of the southeast
rather than turn toward the Baltio or the Ukraine.
In his Sportspalsst speeoh of September 25, 1938,
Hitler deolared he had informed Chamberlain that
Germany had no further territorial ambitions in
Burope.

He also deolared that the non-aggression

pact With poland of 1934 would "bring about lasting
and continuous pacifioation"J a view reiterated in
his speeoh to the Reichstag of January 30, 1939.
lor a people like the Poles, who pride themselves
on realism, Poland's independenoe must seem to rest
on a very fragile basis if it depends merely on
Hitler's self-restraint.

!he Third Reioh has not

postponed its efforts to realise its ambitions, and
there are no indications that the Nazi regime haa
abandoned any of Germany's traditional designs, and
these aspirations oonflict with the poles both in
the Baltic and the Ukraine.
From the economic view, poland's position with
respect to Danzig is fairly strong, should Germ8n7
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annex the Free City, Poland oould divert ita trade
to Gdy.nia, to the injury of Danzig.

Should Hitler

seize Danzig, it is problematioal whether poland
oould hold the Corridor on aocount of its short
width.
In an interview of January 2', 1938, Foreign
Minister Beok deolared that, "the foremost principle
of polish polioy i8 the maintaining of good relatione
with our neighbors, this is why the Polish Government
attaches such great importance to its relations with
Germany and Soviet Russia.
"The Second prinoiple of our polioy is loyal
obserTanoe of the allianoe of Poland to France and

"The

~hird

principle is to oppose any decision

made in matters concerning Poland without co,nsul tilll
her."l
Despite the efforts of both Germany and Italy
to wean Poland away from Franoe after MUnioh, Foreign
Minister Beok declined to make any comments •
. Confronted by Hitler's destruotion of Czeohoslovakia
in patent violation of the MUnich agreement, poland
realized that it woul d be the next object of German
offeneive, unless it showed determination to fight,

--

1. New York Times, January 26, 1939
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oould strengthen its existing allianoes, and find
new support.
In the first week of Maroh, Foreign Minister
Safenoe of Rumania visited Warsaw and as a result the
Polish-Rumanian allianoe was strengthened.
~ritish

publio opinion was oonsiderably aroused

in the meantime, by Hitler's violation of the MUnioh
agreement and the destruotion of Czeohoslovakia.
Realizing finally, that unless reai.tanoe was offered
Nazi Germany would soon dominate Europe and a large
part of the world, prime Minister Chamberlain made a
historio statement in the House of Common.,
193'.

~roh

31,

At that time he gave a temporary and unilateral

assuranoe that "In the event of any aotion whioh olearly
threatened Polish independence and which the Polish
government aooordingly oonsidered it vital to resist
with their national foroeB, HiB

~je8t7'B

Government

would feel themselves bound at onoe to lend the polish
Government all support in their power.

They have given

the Polish Government an assurance to this effeot.

I

may add that the Frenoh Government have authorized me
to make it .plain that they stand in the S8me position
as do His ~jesty's Government."l

1. Buei; Raymond Leslie.

~

cIt., pp. 351-362
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When a London newspaper placed a reetrictiTe
interpretation upon the Chamberlain statement, a
semi-official source declared that this pledge
cOTered Danzig and the Corridor if poland thought
that its independence was threatened there.

By

giTing this pledge Great Britain formally abandonned
its refusal to accept obligations in Central Europe
and in effect proclaimed its frontier was not only
on the Rhine but on the Vistula.
During the next week Foreign Minister Beok paid

a Tisit to London, and Britain and Poland agreed to
enter into a permanent and reoiprooal understanding
to replaoe the assurance given by Chamberlain on
March 31, 1939.
Pending oompletion of the permanent agreement,
Colonel Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister, deolared
that Poland would oonsider itself under obligations
to render assistance to Britain under the s&me
oonditions 8S Britain would be obligated to render
aSSistance to poland.
This mutual aSSistance pact applied to "any threat,
direot or indireot, to the independ.enoe of either."
Reports beoame numerous that nanaig would be

--=---

I. New York Times, April

as,

lO!'

1
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annexed by Germany on Hitler's birthday, April 20,
before the Polish-British guarantee had been finished •
• new faotor disrupted these plans, if they existed.
for on April 15, president Roosevelt addressed hi8
dramatio appeal to Hitler and MUssolini aSking a ten
year pledge of non-aggression toward thir$7 state ••
and proposing a peaoe conference.
Although the message did not specifioally
mention Danzig, Roosevelt probably saved the 'ree City
from German occupation. and thereby averted momentarily
at least, a great war.

Hitler spent the next two

weeks preparing a reply to the Roosevelt plea.

In

"
an addresa to the Reichstag on April 28, the fuhrer
not only rejected the preSident's offer for a multilateral agreement, but denounoed the German-polish
non-aggression pact of January 1934.
He added, oontrary to previous statements. that
the treaty provisions giving poland a corridor to the
se. prevented for "all time the establishment of an
understanding between poland and Germany."
As a result of abrogation of the 1934 pact,
relations between Germany and poland became very tense,
and the Nazis reiterated that Danzig must be returne'
to the Reioh.

r
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On March 21, 1939, Hitler asked to build a
highwa7 -- reported to be fifteen miles in width -as well as a railroad aoross the so-oalled Corridor
under German extraterritorial jurisdiotion.

In

return Hitler would reoognize polish eoonomio right.
in Danzig, inoluding the right to a free harbor.
aooept the present boundaries between the two countrie ••
extend the non-aggression pact for twenty-five years.
Germany also demanded in the same note the return
of Danzig as a "free oity in the frame work of the
German Reich."

1

Poland could not possibly acoept these terms,
beoause the oontrol of the V1stula River and poland's
outlet to the sea would have been plaoed at the
oomplete mercy of Germany.

Onoe Germany had fortified

Dansig, it could easily dominate Gdynia and the
Corridor.

The position of Poland would be partioularly

vulnerable if Germany should build • fifteen mile
wide road aoross Pomorle, polioed by German soldiers.
It would not be long before Germany entrenohed at
the mouth. of.the Vistula River would dominate poland
proper and eventually the whole of Eastern Europe
extending to the Blaok Sea.

As Frederiok II said in

1. Hitler, Adolph, Retohsts! speech of, AprIl 29, 1939
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1'72,

~oever

possesses the mouth of the Vistula

and the city of Danzig will be more the master thaD
the king who rules there. nl
On September first. nineteen hundred and
thirt7-nine, Germany's arm, began an invasion of
poland and on September third, Britain and 'ranee
declared war on Germany.
On September seventeenth, Russia invaded
Poland.
On September twenty-ninth. Russia and Germany
eigned an agreement to partition poland. 2 By this
agreement Germany acquired about three fifths of
poland and Russia took the remainder of the country.
Germany's part was the western section of poland,
RU8sia's holding8 lay to the east, bordering on
Russia.

t.

Wolfe, Henry C., "the Ghoet of the Corridor,"
lI'ew Republic, 92:240, 1937
2. lSi LouisTille Times. September 29, 1939
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THE CONCLUSION
Viewing the faota impartially. 8a the
historian does, we oome to the oonolusion that
the land area of the Polish Corridor in the
light of history belonged to poland, though by
no great margine

Rehearsing the facta of history •

• e find that there was

8

piece of'land, small in

Size and of irregular shape, bordering on the
Bal tic Sea, and of little intrinsic value, which
was once nominally and actualiy Polish.

Then the

Germans took it by foroe and held it for a hundred
an~

fifty years.

The Peaoe Conferenoe of paria

returned it to poland, with Germany protesting,
and thereby separated East Prussia from Germany
Droper.

This was the "Corridor."

The Corridor

gaTe Poland a sea ooast and control of both aide.
of the Vistula RiTer to its mouth where the 'ree
City of Danzig was Situated.
We are foroed to conclude then, that in the
light of history. the Corridor belonged to poland.
~rom

the ethnioal standpoint the population

of the Corridor was Polish by a very small majorityThe inhabitants of the Northern districts of

r
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pomorse, who are known as oashubes, are also
of Polish origin.

!hey apeak a polish dialeci.

In spite of policies of Germanization of this
section by means of German colonists, the people
bave preserved their polish character intact.
Prom 18'1 to 1918, that is, throughout the
duration of the German Empire, the Pomeranian
districts were contlnuously represented in ihe
German parliament by polish deputles and on no
occasion was a German elected in flfteen eleotions.
Ethnioally, then, we mnst conclude that the
Oorridor was polish.
finally, examination of the economio aspect
of the problem convinces us that this territory
is undoubtedly a part of the Polish economic unit
rather than of the German; that it i8 needed &8
an outlet muoh more by the pole8 than by the
Germans; that much more inconvenience would be
suffered by the poles than by the Germans living
in East Prussia; that it would be a very great
economic injury not to permit the Poles to have
this outlet to the Bea from their country under
their own oontrol.

I. Bueil, Raymond LeSlie,

~

cit.,

p.

369

l
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All of these facts le8d us to but one
conclu8ion, and that i8 that poland should have
the

~Cor.ridor.ft

70r historical. ethnical and

eoonomic reasons, we believe that the paris Peaoe
Conference made proper dispo8ition of the land of
the 80-oalled

"~olish

Corridor.-

r

..
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